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Probabilistic Risk Assessment is being increasingly used in a number of industries such 
as nuclear, aerospace, chemical process, to name a few.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) characterizes risk in terms of three questions:  (1) What can go wrong? (2) How 
likely is it? (3) What are the consequences?  Probabilistic Risk Assessment studies 
answer these questions by systematically postulating and quantifying undesired scenarios 
in a highly integrated, top down fashion. The PRA process for technological systems 
typically includes the following steps: objective and scope definition, system 
familiarization, identification of initiating events, scenario modeling, quantification, 
uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, importance ranking, and data analysis.  
Fault trees and event trees are widely used tools for risk scenario analysis in PRAs of 
technological systems. This methodology is most suitable for systems made of hardware 
components.  A more comprehensive treatment of risks of technical systems needs to 
consider the entire environment within which such systems are designed and operated.  
This environment includes the physical environment, the socio-economic environment, 
 
and in some cases the regulatory and oversight environment.  The technical system, 
supported by an organization of people in charge of its operation, is at the cross-section 
of these environments.  
In order to develop a more comprehensive risk model for these systems, an important 
step is to extend the modeling capabilities of the conventional Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment methodology to also include risks associated with human activities and 
organizational factors in addition to hardware and software failures and adverse 
conditions of the physical environment.  The causal modeling should also extend to the 
influence of regulatory and oversight functions.  This research offers such a methodology. 
It proposes a multi-layered modeling approach so that most the appropriate techniques 
are applied to different individual domains of the system.  The approach is called the 
Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) methodology.  The main layers include:  (a) A model to 
define safety/risk context.  This is done using a technique known as event sequence 
diagram (ESD) method that helps define the kinds of accidents and incidents that can 
occur in relation to the system being considered;  (b) A model that captures the behaviors 
of the physical system (hardware, software, and environmental factors) as possible causes 
or contributing factors to accidents and incidents delineated by the event sequence 
diagrams.  This is done by common system modeling techniques such as fault tress (FT); 
and (c) A model to extend the causal chain of events to their potential human and 
organizational roots.  This is done using Bayesian belief networks (BBN).  Bayesian 
belief networks are particularly useful as they do not require complete knowledge of the 
relation between causes and effects.  The integrated model is therefore a hybrid causal 
 
model with the corresponding sets of taxonomies and analytical and computational 
procedures.   
In this research, a methodology to combine fault trees, event trees or event sequence 
diagrams, and Bayesian belief networks has been introduced. Since such hybrid models 
involve significant interdependencies, the nature of such dependencies are first 
determined to pave the way for developing proper algorithmic solutions of the logic 
model. Major achievements of this work are: (1) development of the Hybrid Causal Logic 
model concept and quantification algorithms; (2) development and testing of computer 
implementation of algorithms (collaborative work); (3) development and implementation 
of algorithms for HCL–based importance measures, an uncertainty propagation method 
the BBN models, and algorithms for qualitative-quantitative Bayesian belief networks; 
and (4) development and testing of the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
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1.1 Statement of Problem  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment is being increasingly used in a number of industries such 
as nuclear, aerospace, chemical process, to name a few. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) characterizes risk in terms of three questions: (1) What can go wrong? (2) How 
likely is it? (3) What are the consequences? Probabilistic Risk Assessment studies answer 
these questions by systematically postulating and quantifying undesired scenarios in a 
highly integrated, top down fashion. The process typically includes the following steps: 
objective and scope definition, system familiarization, identification of initiating events, 
scenario modeling, failure modeling, quantification, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity 
analysis, importance ranking, and data analysis.  
 
Fault trees (FT) and event trees (ET) are widely used tools in probabilistic risk 
assessment of technological systems. Risk scenarios are developed initially with a 
technique known as event sequence diagram (ESD) and then their binary logic version in 
form of event trees. The probabilities of these risk scenarios are quantified in terms of the 
probabilities of various constituent events. An event tree starts with the “initiating event” 
and progresses through a series of successes or failures of “intermediate events” until the 
various “end states” are reached. Details regarding the occurrences of the various “top 
events” of the event trees are further developed, when necessary, using fault tress. Figure 

































Figure 1: Conventional Probabilistic Risk Assessment structure 
 
Figure 1, shows an event tree including its initiating event and two pivotal events – 
system operation, operator action; and one fault tree including top event – system failure 
and three basic events – A, B, C.  The analysis includes the scenario generation, scenario 
quantification, cut set identification and importance measure.   
 
The fault tree is a deductive analysis tool that evaluates the failure, including the type and 
probability, in the event tree. The fault tree consists of three parts. The top part is the “top 
event”, which corresponds to the failure of a pivotal event in the risk scenario. The 
middle part consists of intermediate events causing failure of the top event. These events 
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are linked through logic gates to the bottom part of the fault tree - the basic events, whose 
failure ultimately causes the top event to occur. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment quantifies scenarios including estimating the frequency of 
and the consequence of the undesired end states. The frequency of occurrence of each 
end state is quantified using a fault tree linking approach.  This results in a logical 
product of the initiating event frequency and the probabilities of each pivotal event along 
the scenario path from the initiating event to the end state.  
 
The methodology is most suitable for hardware systems of components. A more 
comprehensive treatment of risks of technical systems needs to consider the entire 
environment within which such systems are designed and operated. This environment 
includes the physical environment, the socio-economic environment, and in some cases 
the regulatory and oversight environment.  The technical system, supported by an 
organization of people in charge of its operation, is at the cross-section of these 
environments. This is depicted by Figure 2. A good example of such systems is the civil 
aviation system as a whole, which is an extremely complex web of private and 
governmental organizations, operating or regulating flights involving diverse types of 
aircraft, ground support, and other physical and organizational infrastructures. In contrast 
with many other complex systems, the aviation system may be characterized as an “open” 
system, as the there are large numbers of dynamic interfaces with outside organizations, 














Figure 2: Systems and their complex environment 
 
The external environments include the physical environment, the regulatory/ oversight 
environment, and the socio-economic environment. At the intersection of these 
environments, the physical system (e.g., aircraft, ground support infrastructure), is 
operated and maintained by one or more organizations, through individuals interfacing 
directly with the physical system. All interfaces are dynamic and interactions and 
interdependencies are subject to change in manners that may or may not be planned or 
anticipated. A truly “systems approach” to analyzing and assessing the safety 
performance of such systems would have to explicitly account for role and effects of 
these various elements in an integrated fashion.   
In order to develop a more comprehensive risk model for these systems, and important 
steps is to extend the modeling capabilities of the conventional Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment methodology to also include risks associated with human activities and 
organizational factors in addition to hardware and software failures, and adverse 
conditions of the physical environment.  The causal modeling should also extend to the 
influence of regulatory and oversight functions.  
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This research offers such a methodology.  The method developed has its roots in 
conventional risk analysis techniques used for complex engineered systems, but it has 
been extended to include the organizational and regulatory environment of the physical 
system. It recognizes that in order to fully and realistically capture the factors that 
directly or indirectly impact system risk one has to look at all of the interactive elements 
and dimensions of this heterogeneous system.   
This is achieved through a multi-layered modeling approach so that most appropriate 
modeling techniques are applied in the different individual domains of the system.  The 
approach is called the Hybrid Causal Logic model. The main layers include: 
a) A model to define safety context. This is done using the event sequence diagram 
(ESD) method that helps define the kinds of accidents and incidents that system 
being analyzed could experience.    
b) A model to capture the behaviors of the physical system (hardware, software, and 
environmental factors) as possible causes or contributing factors to accidents and 
incidents delineated by the event sequence diagrams. This is done by common 
system modeling techniques such as fault trees.  
c) A model to extend the causal chain of events to potential human and 
organizational roots. This is done using Bayesian belief networks. Bayesian belief 
networks are particularly useful, as they do not require complete knowledge of 
relation between causes and their potential effects. [Cowell, 1999][Jensen, 
2001][Russell and Norvig, 2003][Pearl, 2001][Lauritzen, 1996] 
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The integrated model is therefore a hybrid causal logic (HCL) model with the 
corresponding sets of taxonomies and analytical and computational procedures.  The 
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Figure 3: Hybrid risk assessment framework 
 
 
Here, as in all modeling and analysis methodologies, the scope of analysis, domain of 
application, and the needs they intend to address, play a central role in defining the focus, 
general nature, and specific details.  The proposed methodology is intended to address 
multiple requirements and practical needs.  Some of the specific requirements include the 
ability to  
1) Identify safety hazards and risks, including those rooted in the system and its 
external and internal physical, human, organizational, and regulatory 
environments, and 





1.2 Major Achievements 
In this research, a methodology to combine fault trees, event trees or event sequence 
diagrams, and Bayesian belief networks has been introduced. Since such hybrid models 
involve significant interdependencies, the nature of such dependencies are first 
determined to pave the way for developing proper algorithmic solutions of the logic 
model. Major achievements of this work are:  
• development of the Hybrid Causal Logic model concept and quantification 
algorithms; (2) development and testing of computer implementation of 
algorithms (collaborative work);  
• development and implementation of algorithms for HCL–based importance 
measures, an uncertainty propagation method the BBN models, and algorithms for 
qualitative-quantitative Bayesian belief networks; and  
• development and testing of the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
software based on HCL methodology.    
HCL successfully incorporates the capability of handling uncertain and incomplete 
information in risk assessment.    
1.3 Dissertation Outline  
The remainder of this dissertation describes the details of the various methods and 
algorithms of the methodology. In Sections 2 and 3, the three main layers of the 
framework are described. Section 4 shows how these three are integrated into the unified 
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methodology, Hybrid Causal Logic, including mathematical algorithms for solving the 
model. Sections 5, 6, and 7 generalize the various Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
techniques for the Hybrid Causal Logic-based modeling method.  These include: the risk 
importance measures (Section 5), the safety performance indicators (Section 6,) the 
uncertainty analysis (Section7), and Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian belief networks 
(Section 8).  Section 9 is devoted to a short description of a software implementation of 
the methodology, the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) software package. 










2. Basic Building Blocks of Conventional Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment  
2.1 Event Sequence Diagram Methodology  
2.1.1 Basics  
To describe the essence and role of event sequence diagram, we refer to Figure 4. This 

















Figure 4: Accident scenario context for safety analysis 
 
The figure depicts the change of state of an aircraft initially operating within the "safe 
functional/physical zone" (shaded area).  At point "A" an event (e.g., equipment failure) 
occurs causing deviation from the safe zone, putting the aircraft in an undesired state 
(point "B").  Another event (e.g., crew recovery action) is initiated at that point, and 
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depending on the whether it succeeds or fails, the aircraft is put back into the safe zone 
(point "C") or an accident occurs (point "F").  The sequence of events from A (the 
initiating event) to the end states (C or F) forms two simple scenarios.  These scenarios 
provide the context within which the events and their causes are evaluated as potential 
hazards or sources of risk.  
Event sequence diagram method is a powerful modeling tool for developing possible 
scenarios. It enables one to visualize the logical and temporal sequence of causal factors, 
leading to various states of the system. A set of graphical symbols is used to describe the 
various elements of a scenario. Figure 5 shows a simple event sequence diagram.  Event 









Figure 5: Event Sequence Diagram Concept 
 
The possible events or conditions (rectangles in the diagram) that can follow the initiating 
event are then listed in the proper temporal or logical order with lines connecting them, 
forming various possible strings or sequences of events that ultimately end with a 
diamond symbol representing the end states of the sequences.  Pivotal events have a 
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single input line, and a YES/ NO pair of output lines, depending on whether the pivotal 
event occurs (YES output) or otherwise (NO output).  The same applies in the case of 
conditions where YES means the condition is satisfied, and NO means the opposite.   
An event sequence diagram, therefore, is a visual representation of a set of possible risk 
scenarios originating from an initiating event.  Each scenario consists of a unique 
sequence of occurrences and non-occurrences of pivotal events (point B or C in Figure 5).  
Each scenario eventually leads to an end state, which designates the severity of the 
outcome of the particular scenario.  Figure 6 is an example of a very simple event 
sequence diagram where given the occurrence of the initiating event, the state of System 
1 (a pivotal event) determines whether the sequence leads to success (end state S), when 
it works, or a human action is required, when it fails. Given the success of human action, 
another pivotal event (state of System 2) will determine the final outcome:  success state 
(S) if System 2 works, and failed state (F) if it fails.  The failure of human action also 
leads to failed state F.  Therefore, this simple event sequence diagram depicts four 















Event sequence diagrams are extremely versatile and can be used to model many 
situations ranging from behavior of purely static systems to many types of dynamic 
systems.  Historically, Event sequence diagram has been a loosely defined term and it has 
been used in a variety of industries for different purposes.  They have been used in 
probabilistic risk analyses by the nuclear power industry to develop and document the 
basis for risk scenarios, and also to communicate risk assessment results and models to 
designers, operators, analysts, and regulators.  Event sequence diagrams have also been 
used in the aviation industry as part of safety and reliability analysis of aircraft systems.  
NASA has used event sequence diagrams to help identify accident scenarios.  In all three 
applications mentioned above the event sequence diagrams have been used both 
qualitatively for identification of hazards and risk scenarios as well as quantitatively to 
find probabilities of risk scenarios [NASA PRA Procedures Guide, 2001].  
2.1.2 Event Sequence Diagram Components 
Event sequence diagrams are constructed using graphical symbols representing events, 
conditions, and decision gates.  These are defined in the following: 
Events: Events can be any observable physical event or condition (e.g., failure or 
degraded state hydraulic system, crew action, air turbulence, etc).  The symbols used to 
represent events can be seen in Table 1 along with a brief summary of event types.   
An initiating event is the first event in an event sequence diagram.  It is the one event that 
starts the sequence of events mapped out in the event sequence diagram.  A circle is used 
to indicate the initiating event in the event sequence diagram.  The event sequence 
diagram ends in one or more end states or terminating events, which are indicted by a 
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diamond.  A pivotal event is an event that has two mutually exclusive outcomes: "yes" 
(event occurrence) and "no" (event non-occurrence).  
 
Initiating Event: The first event in an event sequence diagram.  
Initiates a sequence of events.  There is only one initiating event 
in an event sequence diagram. 
 
Comments: Comments offer information about the scenario 
without affecting the outcome of the scenario.  Comments are 
often provided for user clarification and readability and have no 




Pivotal Event: An event with two mutually exclusive outcomes 
(paths) corresponding to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the 
event.  Typical outcomes are "yes" and "no". 
Deterministic Delay: A situation in which no event can occur 
for the known duration of the delay.  Following events may 
occur immediately after the delay, which effectively shifts the 
time to occurrence of events following it. 
 
Random Delay: Similar to a deterministic delay, except that the 
duration of the delay is random within a prescribed window and 
defined by a time to completion distribution. 
 
End State: The end point of an event sequence diagram 





Table 1: Events in an event sequence diagram 
2.1.3 Event Sequence Diagram Construction and Quantification 
An event sequence diagram can be constructed from the set of events, conditions, and 
decision gates in combination with the physical parameters, constraints, and dependency 
rules.  As in any modeling endeavor, event sequence diagram construction requires 
definition of the scope and identification of appropriate levels of abstraction. Both are 
dependent on the objectives of the analysis, as well as availability of data and resources.  
For instance while in principle it is possible to develop highly detailed scenario models 
with all possible causal chains of its events, it is often more useful to keep the event 
sequence diagrams at a relatively high level of abstraction, leaving the more detailed 
causal explanation to other models.  A good example is the case where it is judged that 
the pivotal event "failure of a single engine" is of sufficient explanatory power in 
defining possible accident scenarios in an event sequence diagram.  If necessary, the 
causes of the event (e.g., failures of various components of the engine) can be analyzed 
and represented by a corresponding fault tree (see discussion on Fault Tree methodology).    
Initiators are normally the causes of departures and deviation from the norm, or an event 
that puts the system in a path that makes it susceptible to events, which could cause the 
deviation from the norm, with a potential to lead to an accident.  According to [NASA 
PRA Guidebook 2002], a useful starting point for identification of initiating events is a 
specification of 'normal' operations in terms of the nominal values of a suitably chosen 
set of physical parameters and the envelope in this variable space outside of which an 
initiating event would be deemed to have occurred.  Initiating events are usually active 
rather than latent conditions or events.   
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Prior to constructing event sequence diagrams, it is helpful to identify important features 
or characteristics that would distinguish different classes of accidents scenarios, their 
initiation, progression, and dominant aspects of the system's physical or operational 
aspects. Examples are division by phase of flight, organization, location, system, crew, 
etc.  Among other benefits is the fact that in doing so, interdependencies between 
different events are to some extent avoided, making further development of causal factors 
in other layers of the hybrid causal model easier and more transparent.  
The pivotal events can be either a branch point (where several outcomes are possible) or 
"pinch points" where several upstream sequences are merged meaning that the future 
developments of the scenarios (downstream form the pivotal event) are not dependent on 
how we got to the pivotal event.   
Care must be exercised that the path-independent character is not only checked for the 
basic nature of the event but also its probability, as all events in an event sequence 
diagram are in principle conditional on the past.  Similar to initiating events, pivotal 
events are normally active events.  
Figure 7 is an example of event sequence diagram [Work done at National Aerospace 





Crew fails to regain 
directional control




















takes off with 
propulsion system 
failure
(1) appropriate response would be to initiate an RTO when V<V1
Crew fails to 







Figure 7: An example of generic event sequence diagram (Loss of Control during Takeoff) 
2.2 Event Trees 
Another method closely related to event sequence diagrams and used in risk and safety 
analysis of complex systems are event trees and decision trees.  Both are inductive logic 
methods for identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initiating event. 
As in event sequence diagrams, an event tree begins with a defined accident-initiating 
event.  This event could arise from failure of a system component, or it could be initiated 
externally to the system.  Different event trees must be constructed and evaluated to 
analyze a set of accidents.  Once an initiating event is defined, all of the safety systems 
that can be utilized after the accident initiation must be defined and identified.  These 
safety systems are then structured in the form of headings for the event tree.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 8 for two safety systems that can be involved after the defined 
initiating event has occurred. 
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Figure 8: Illustration of an event tree 
 
Once the system failure and success states have been properly defined, the states are then 
combined through the decision-tree branching logic to obtain the various accident 
sequences that are associated with the given initiating event.  As illustrated in Figure 8, 
the initiating event is depicted by the initial horizontal line and the system states are then 
connected in a stepwise, branching fashion; system success and failure states have been 
denoted by S and F, respectively.  The format illustrated follows the standard tree 
structure characteristic of event tree methodology, although sometimes the fault states are 
located above the success states. 
The accident sequences that result from the tree structure are shown in the last column of 
Figure 8.  Each branch of the tree yields one particular accident sequence; for example, I 
S1 F2 denotes the accident sequence in which the initiating event (I) occurs, system 1 is 
called upon and succeeds (S1), and system 2 is called upon but is in a failed state so that it 
does not perform its defined function.  For larger event trees, this stepwise branching 
would simply be continued. 
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2.3 Fault Tree Modeling 
Fault tree analysis is a technique by which many events that interact to produce other 
events can be related using simple logical relationships (AND, OR, etc.); these 
relationships permit a methodical building of a structure that represents the system. Fault 
tree analysis is the most popular technique used for qualitative and quantitative risk and 
reliability studies [Henley et al. 1981, Malhotra et al. 1994].  Fault trees have been 
extended to include various types of logic relations - Priority AND gates, Sequence 
Dependency gates, Exclusive OR gates, and Inhibitor gates [Dugan et al. 1990] and have 
been extended to include multi-state systems [Veeraraghavan et al.1994, Wood 1985, Yu 
et al. 1994, and Zang et al.2003]. 
To conduct the construction of a fault tree for a complicated system, it is necessary to 
first understand how the system functions.  A system function diagram (or flow diagram) 
is used to initially depict the pathways by which signals or materials are transmitted 
between components comprising the system.  A second diagram, a functional logic 
diagram, is sometimes needed to depict the logical relationships of the components. 
Only after the functioning of the system is fully understood should an analyst construct a 
fault tree.  Of course, for simpler systems, the function and logic diagrams and a Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis are unnecessary and fault tree construction can begin 
immediately. 
In fault tree construction, the system failure event that is to be studied is called the top 
event.  Successive subordinate (i.e., subsystem) failure events that may contribute to the 
occurrence of the top event are identified and linked to the top event by logical 
connective functions.  The subordinate events themselves are then broken down to their 
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logical contributors and, in this manner, a fault tree structure is created.  Progress in the 
synthesis of the tree is recorded graphically by arranging the events into a tree structure 
using connecting symbols called gates. 
When a contributing failure event can be divided no further, or when it is decided to limit 
further analysis of a subsystem, the corresponding branch is terminated with a basic event.    
In practice, all basic events are taken to be statistically independent unless they are 
identified as "common cause failures".  Such failures are those that arise from a common 
cause or initiating event, in which case, two or more primary events are no longer 
independent. 
2.3.1 Fault Tree Building Blocks  
There are two types of building blocks: gate symbols and event symbols. A sample 










Figure 9: Example of a fault tree logic diagram 
 













Gate symbols connect events according to their causal relations.  A gate may have one or 
more input events but only one output event.  The output events of AND gates occur if all 
input events occur simultaneously.  On the other hand, the output events of OR gates 
happen if any one of the input events occurs.  Example of these logic gates is shown in 
Figure 9 where we see that "Light Is Off" if "Light Bulb Is Failed" OR "Wire Is Failed" 
OR "Switch Fails Open".  The causal relation expressed by an AND gate or OR gate is 
said to be deterministic because the occurrence of the output event is completely 
controlled by the input events.  There are causal relations that are not deterministic.  
Consider the two events: "a person is struck by an automobile" and "a person dies".  The 
causal relation of these two events is not deterministic but probabilistic because the 
accident does not always result in a death. 
The basic event, a circle, represents a basic initiating fault event that requires no further 
development.  In other words, the circle signifies that the appropriate limit of resolution 
has been reached.   
                    AND – Out put occurs if all of the input events happens 
 
                    OR – Out put occurs if at least one of the input events occurs 
                 
                     BASIC EVENT – A basic event requiring no further development 
 
                     CONDITIONING EVENT – Specific conditions or restrictions that apply to 
any logic gate ( used primarily with PRIORITY AND and INHIBIT gate) 
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                   UNDEVELOPED EVENT – An event which is not further developed either 
because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable 
                   INTERMEDIATE EVENT – An event occurs because one or more 
antecedent causes acting through logic gates 
Figure 10: Basic Fault Tree Building Blocks 
 
2.3.2 Fault Tree Evaluation  
Once the tree structure has been established, subsequent analysis is deductive and takes 
two forms, either qualitative or quantitative.  The purpose of a qualitative analysis is to 
reduce the tree to a logically equivalent form in terms of the specific combinations of 
basic events sufficient to cause the undesired top event to occur.  Each combination will 
be a “minimal cut set” of failure modes for the tree. One procedure for reducing the tree 
to a logically equivalent form is by the use of Boolean algebra.  The second form of 
analysis is quantitative or numerical, in which case, the logical structure is used as a 
model for computation of the effects of selected combinations of primary event failures. 
Quantitative analysis of the fault tree consists of transforming its established logical 
structure into an equivalent probability expression and numerically calculating the 
probability of occurrence of the top event from the probabilities of occurrence of the 
basic events.  For example for a hardware failure basic event the probability could be that 
of the failure of component or subsystem during the mission time of interest, T.  In such 
cases the failure probability may be independent of time, such as a demand failure 
probability or a steady-state unavailability, or the probability may change with time. 
Once constructed, a fault tree can be described by a set of Boolean algebraic equations, 
one for each gate of the tree.  For each gate, the input events (such as primary events) are 
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the independent variables, and the output event (such as an intermediate event) is the 
dependent variable.  Utilizing the rules for Boolean algebra, it is then possible to solve 
these equations so that the top and intermediate events are individually expressed in 
terms of minimal cut sets that involve only basic events. 
To determine the minimal cut sets of a fault tree, the tree is first translated to its 
equivalent Boolean equations and then either the "top-down" or "bottom-up" substitution 
method is used.  The methods are straightforward and they involve substituting and 
expanding Boolean expressions.  Two Boolean laws, the distributive law and the law of 
absorption, are used to remove the redundancies. 
2.4 Linked Fault Tree and Event Sequence Diagram 
In the probabilistic risk assessment, the event sequence diagram is often used to model a 
set of possible accident scenarios originating from an initiating event. Each scenario in an 
event sequence diagram consists of a unique sequence of occurrences and non-
occurrences of pivotal events. Each scenario eventually leads to an end state, which 
designates the severity of the outcome of the particular scenario. 
Initiating events as well as pivotal events in the event sequence diagrams are detailed 
using fault trees (This is the approach in the Quantitative Risk Assessment System 
(QRAS)) [Groen et al., 2002] similar to the event tree/fault tree combination in classical 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
In this research, the fault tree and event sequence diagram quantification is carried out 
using Binary Decision Diagram technology, which are now widely recognized for their 
speed and accuracy. 
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2.5 Binary Decision Diagram Approach to Solve the Fault 
Trees or Linked Fault Trees and Event Sequence Diagrams 
Boolean analysis allows the analyst to solve the fault tree through generation of cut sets. 
Boolean analysis quantifies the fault tree by relating the gate input events (the 
independent variables) to their corresponding output event (the dependent variables). In 
more recent years fault tree solution methods using binary decision diagram have gained 
popularity due to their unquestionable superiority over the conventional algorithms both 
in accuracy and efficiency.  This method is therefore used in developing the algorithms 
for solving the hybrid causal diagrams in this research. The following describe the 
fundamentals.   
2.5.1 Binary Decision Diagrams  
A binary decision diagram is a directed, acyclic graph. It was introduced by Lee [Lee 
1959] and Akers [Akers 1978], utilized by Bryant [Bryant 1987, Bryant & etc. 1990], 
improved by Rauzy [Rauzy 1993, Rauzy & etc. 1997], and enhanced in efficiency and 



















In effect, a binary decision diagram is a binary decision tree over the Boolean variables 
with node unification occurring for identical Boolean expressions. A binary decision 
diagram is a rooted, directed, acyclic graph with an unconstrained number of in-edges 
and two out-edges, one for each two states of any given variable. As a result, the binary 
decision diagram has only two terminal nodes labeled 0 and 1, (one or zero representing 
the Boolean values true or false) representing the final value of the expression. (see for 
example Figure 11 in which A and B represent events).  
Each non-terminal node or vertex has a 0 branch representing basic event non-occurrence 
and a 1 branch representing basic event occurrence.  Each node X in the binary decision 
diagram can be written in an If-Then-Else (ITE) format [Rauzy & etc. 1997] derived 
from Shannon's formula: 
2121 fXXf]f,f,X[ITE +=  
where f1 and f2 are Boolean functions with X = 1 and 0X = , respectively which are of 
one order less than X. 
2.5.2 Relation between Fault Tree and Binary Decision Diagram  
A fault tree in the graph theory language is an acyclic graph with internal nodes that are 
logic gates (e.g., AND, OR, K-out-of-N) and external nodes (basic events) that represent 
system events. Since the events in fault trees are binary by definition and since the fault 
tree structure is essentially a Boolean expression, any fault tree can be represented by an 
equivalent binary decision diagram.  Figure 12 shows a number of simple fault tree 































Figure 12: Binary decision diagram representations of simple fault tree 
 
2.5.3 Recursive Formulation of If-Then-Else Engine 
Binary decision diagram has the advantage that its quantification does not require the 
determination of the minimal cut sets or "prime implicants" as an intermediate stage, 
saving on computation time and improving the accuracy. Converting a fault tree structure 
to a binary decision diagram is the primary cost. 
The probability of the top event of a fault tree is a function of the probabilities of its 
primary events, and can be calculated by means of a binary decision diagram traversal, 
with the Shannon decomposition being applied on each node of the binary decision gram. 
In its most basic form for a binary decision diagram structure f = ite (X1, f1, f0),  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )01 fPrXPr1fPrXPrfPr ⋅−+⋅=  
Where Pr(X) denotes the probability that X = 1, and Pr(f) the probability that f = 1. 
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Figure 13 shows the quantification of a case where the Top Event as a function of the 
basic events A, B, and C is f = {A ⋅ C or B ⋅ C}.  The probability of this top event is 
calculated by summing over the probabilities of the various paths leading to 1.  One path 









Pr(AC + BC) = Pr(AC) + Pr(ABC)
 
 
Figure 13: Example quantification of a Simple BDD structure of basic events A, B, and C 
                                   
2.5.4 Solving Combined Fault Trees and Event Sequence 
Diagrams Using Binary Decision Diagrams 
 As discussed earlier one of the most effective ways of modeling risks associated with 
complex systems is by using event sequence diagrams as the first layer of describing 
system behavior in case of anomalies, and then providing the more detailed picture of the 
contributing causes (of the events in the event sequence diagram) by fault trees.  Since 
event sequence diagrams in their most basic form are reducible to binary logic, the 
combination of event sequence diagrams and fault trees can be converted into a binary 
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decision diagram also. The process is depicted in Figure 14.  This approach was used in 














Figure 14: Use of binary decision diagrams to solve combined event sequence diagram 
and fault tree models 
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3. Bayesian Belief Networks Applied in Hybrid Causal Logic 
3.1 Why Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian belief networks can offer a compact, intuitive, and efficient graphical 
representation of dependence relations and conditional independence between entities of 
a domain.  The graphical structure shows properties of the problem domain in an intuitive 
way, which makes it easy for non-experts of Bayesian belief networks to understand and 
build this kind of knowledge representation.  It is possible to utilize both background 
knowledge, such as expert knowledge, and knowledge stored in databases when 
constructing Bayesian belief networks. 
The compact and efficient nature of Bayesian belief network models has been exploited 
to develop efficient algorithms for solving queries.  Queries include diagnosis, explain 
away, and so on. [Jensen, 2001] 
Answering a query is a basic function of Bayesian belief networks. Furthermore, the 
results of a query can be analyzed by using Bayesian belief networks.  For instance, in the 
field of health care, where a patient has been prescribed a dangerous, high-risk treatment, 
the patient may want an explanation as to why he or she needs this treatment.  Bayesian 
networks can be used to provide such an explanation.  Similarly, in the practice of risk 
assessment, some observations about the state of the system may be conflicting. 
Considering the results of two different tests, one test result may indicate that the risk is 
not high enough to shut down the system, whereas the other test result may indicate the 
contrary.  Data conflict analysis in Bayesian belief networks can be used to identify, trace, 
and resolve possible conflicts in the observations made. [Jensen, 2001] 
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In the expert judgment practice, the expert is so called in one domain instead of all areas. 
The question is how sensitive the query is to each expert when there are different experts 
in the model.  This sensitivity analysis can be performed using Bayesian belief networks. 
[Jensen, 2001][Neapolitan, 2004] In this research, the measures and justification are 
shown.  
In a decision making scenario, the decision maker may need to acquire additional 
information before a decision can be made.  In this application, Bayesian belief networks 
can be extended to the influence diagram.  A common example is a decision on whether 
or not to drill for oil at a specific site.  The result of an additional test may change the 
decision, but is it worth the cost to perform the test?  The influence diagram is a very 
useful tool for answering this kind of question.  Analyzing the result obtained from 
queries against a Bayesian belief network can provide a lot of information.  
Bayesian belief networks have been used as a practical technique for assessing 
uncertainty in large and complex systems. [Russell and Norvig 2003] 
3.2 Why Do We Need Bayesian Belief Networks for Probability 
Computations 
Bayesian belief networks make explicit the dependencies between different variables. In 
general, there may be relatively few direct dependencies (modeled by arcs between nodes 
of the network); this means that many of the variables are conditionally independent.  
The conditional independence in a network drastically reduces the computations 
necessary to work out all the probabilities.  In general, all probabilities can be computed 
from the joint probability distribution.  In addition, this joint probability distribution is far 
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simpler to compute when there are a large number of conditionally independent nodes.  
Comparing the polytree and the non-polytree graph, the computation cost differs 
significantly.  
Suppose, for example in Figure 15, that we have a network consisting of five variables A, 
B, C, D, and E.  If we do not specify the dependencies explicitly, then we are essentially 
assuming that all the variables are dependent on each other.  The chain rule enables us to 
calculate the joint probability distribution ),,,,( EDCBAP as: 
)()|(),|(),,|(),,,|(),,,,( EPEDPEDCPEDCBPEDCBAPEDCBAP =  











Figure 15: Bayesian belief networks reduce computation cost 
 
Then the joint probability distribution ),,,,( EDCBAP is greatly simplified: 







Bayesian belief networks on their own enable us to model uncertain events and 
arguments about them.  The intuitive graphical representation can be very useful in 
clarifying previously opaque assumptions or reasoning hidden in the head of an expert. 
With Bayesian belief networks, it is possible to articulate expert beliefs about the 
dependencies between different variables.  Bayesian belief networks allow an injection of 
scientific rigor when the probability distributions associated with individual nodes are 
simply ‘expert opinions'.  Bayesian belief networks can expose some of the common 
fallacies in reasoning due to misunderstanding of the probability. 
The real power of Bayesian belief networks comes when we apply an inference algorithm 
to consistently propagate the impact of evidence on the probabilities of uncertain 
outcomes.  A Bayesian belief network will derive all the implications of the beliefs that 
are input to it; some of these will be facts that can be checked against observations, or 
simply against the experience of the decision makers themselves. 
 
3.3 Bayesian Belief Networks Basics  
Bayesian belief networks are currently the predominant uncertainty knowledge 
representation and reasoning technique in artificial intelligence. [Cowell, 1999][Jensen, 
2001][Russell and Norvig, 2003][Pearl, 2001][Lauritzen, 1996]. Figure 16 is a well-
known example presented by Cowell [Cowell, 1999] in the area of artificial reasoning.  
A Bayesian belief network represents the joint probability distribution (JPD) that may be 
written as  










Figure 16: A medical diagnosis example [Cowell 1999] 
During the early 1990s, Bayesian belief networks (also called Bayesian networks, belief 
networks, and causal probabilistic networks) were a hot topic not only among research 
institutions, but also in the private industry.  In the field of artificial intelligence, much 
research work and application have been done based on Bayesian belief networks.  The 
difference with other expert system techniques is that Bayesian belief networks require 
the user to have good insight, plus theoretical and practical experience in order to exploit 


















In all expert systems, one of the problems is how to treat uncertainty. Uncertainty has 
many sources, such as inaccurate observation or incomplete or vague information; 
additionally the relation in the domain may be of non-deterministic type.  
The Bayesian belief network is the combination of graph theory and probability theory.  
Bayesian Inference Rule  
The probability )(AP  of an event A is a number between [0,1]. Probabilities obey the 
following basic axioms:  
- 1)( =AP  if and only if A is certain. 
- If A and B are mutually exclusive, then )()()( BPAPBandAP +=  
The following is a basic rule of probability calculus for dependent events: 
),()()|( BAPBPBAP = , where ),( BAP  is the probability of the joint event A and B.  
Universally, it can be written as )|,()|(),|( HBAPHBPHBAP = , recognizing a body 
of knowledge, H.  
Further, )()|()()|( APABPBPBAP =  






ABP =  
D-Separation: [Jensen et al., 1990] 
Two variables, A and B, in a causal network are d-separated if, for all paths between A 
and B, there is an intermediate variable V, such that either 
- the connection is serial or diverging and the state of V is known, or 












The d-separation is explained in the Figure 17 and Figure 18.  In Figure 17, A has an 
influence on B which will influence C. Similarly, evidence on C will influence the 
certainty on A through B. Obviously, if the state of B is known, then the channel is 










Figure 18: Converging connections example to explain d-separation 
 
 
In the converging connection of Figure 18, the evidence may be transmitted through a 
converging connection if either the variable in the connection or one of its descendants 
has received evidence. 
Conditional Independence [Jensen et al., 1990]:  





Conditional independence occurs when two variables are d-separated.  This means two 
variables, A and B, in a causal network if for all paths between A and B there is an 
intermediate variable V, such that either  
-the connection is serial or diverging and the state of V is known, or 
-the connection is converging and neither V nor any of V’s descendants has received 
evidence  
Inference in Bayesian Belief Networks 
The purpose of Bayesian belief networks is to make inference under uncertainty.  The 
task is to find the probability of an event given some or no instantiation/evidence of the 
system state. There are four types of inference [Russell and Norvig 2003]: 
1) Diagnostic Inference - updating beliefs from effects to causes. 
2) Causal Inference - updating beliefs from causes to effects.  This is similar to 
inference in fault tree and event tree analyses. 
3) Inter-Causal Inference - also called explaining away, involves updating beliefs 
between causes of a common effect. 
4) Mixed Inference - this involves updating beliefs using a mixture of the other 
above inferences types. 
The Hybrid Causal Logic approach in this research mainly uses causal inference.   
3.4 Bayesian Belief Networks Inference Algorithms 
Inference algorithms include exact and approximate inferences. Pearl published an 
efficient message propagation inference algorithm for polytrees [Pearl, 1982][Kim and 
Pear 1983] and developed the clustering algorithm for exact inferences in general 
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Bayesian belief networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters [Pearl 
1986-1][Pearl 1986-2].  For multiply connected networks, a conditioning algorithm is 
presented by [Pearl 1986-1][Darwiche, 1995][Peot and Shachter, 1991][Diez, 1996]. 
There are local conditioning algorithms [Diez, 1996], global conditioning [Shachter et al., 
1994], dynamic conditioning [Darwiche, 1995], and recursive conditioning algorithms 
[Darwiche, 2001]. In our algorithm, the refined conditioning method is used when 
computing the information sent from a Bayesian belief network to a fault tree.   
The variable elimination (VE) algorithm [Zhang and Poole, 1994][Shachter et al., 
1990][Li and D’Ambrosio, 1994][Dechter, 1996][Zhang and Poole, 1996] is a simple and 
intuitive approach that eliminates other variables one by one by summing them out.  The 
complexity of variable elimination algorithm can be measured by the number of 
numerical multiplications and numerical summations it performs.  An optimal 
elimination ordering is one that results in the least complexity, but the problem of finding 
an optimal elimination ordering is NP-complete [Arnborg et al., 1987].  Later, the 
junction tree algorithm [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988] was developed; this is a time-
efficient and space-efficient version of a variable elimination algorithm.  It makes it 
possible to get all node posterior probability in one run, as compared to the variable 
elimination algorithm that can only quantify one node at a time.  In our algorithm, the 
iterative heuristic algorithm is based on the variable elimination algorithm.  
 
Variable Elimination Algorithm [Zhang and Poole, 1994][Shachter et al., 1990][Li and 
D’Ambrosio, 1994][Dechter, 1996][Zhang and Poole, 1996]: 
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Define ),...,,( 21 kXXXf as a factor that is a table of numbers, one for each instantiation 
of the variables kXXX ,...,, 21 , ))(|( jj XParentXP as the Conditional Probability Tables 
(CPT) for Bayesian belief networks, each CPT in a Bayesian belief networks is a factor. 
Let F (a set of factors) be { }),...,1:)(|( njXParentXP jj =  
Choose an elimination ordering nZZ ,...,1  of variables in Z. 




×××=∑ ...21 , where the if are the 
factors in F that include jZ  
Remove the factors if (that mention jZ  ) from F and add new factor jg to F 
Return )( FFf∈∏   
Briefly, the method is moving all relevant terms inside of the innermost sum, performing 
the innermost sum to get a new term, inserting the new term into the product, then 
returning to execute it again until all irrelevant terms are summed out. 
A common heuristic for eliminating variables is to construct the moral graph [Jensen 
2001] and eliminate the variable that will add the fewest number of new edges.  For 
polytrees, one needs to always eliminate singly connected nodes in the moral graph at 
each stage.  In general Bayesian belief networks finding the optimal elimination ordering 
is NP-complete. 
 
Conditioning Algorithm [[Pearl 1986-1][Darwiche, 1995][Peot and Shachter, 
1991][Diez, 1996] 
The conditioning method is mainly used to break a loop to a poly tree in Bayesian belief 
networks (See Figure 19).  The conditioning method consists of instantiating a variable 
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and thereby blocking information path.  For directed acyclic graphs with several loops, 
the technique is repeated until the resulting structure is a polytree.  The number of 
polytree propagations will be the product of the number of states in the conditioning 




aXPXP ),()(   if A is instantiated to the 














Figure 19: The conditioning breaks the Bayesian belief network into two new polytree 
Bayesian belief networks 
The method of cut conditioning, which was developed as a constraint satisfaction 
problem, avoids the construction of exponentially large tables.  In a Bayesian belief 
network, a cutset is a set of nodes that, when instantiated, reduces the remaining nodes to 
a polytree that can be solved in linear time and space.  The query is answered by 
summing over all the instantiations of the cutset, so the overall space requirement is still 
linear [Pearl, 1988].  A recursive conditioning algorithm allows a complete range of 
space and time tradeoffs. [Darwiche, 2001] 
 
Junction Tree Algorithm [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988] 
A junction tree algorithm is a more time efficient and space efficient version of variable 
elimination algorithm.  In variable elimination algorithms, the query variable must be 
specified first.  This means each time, for each different query, the entire algorithm must 
be run again.  Junction tree algorithms can support the simultaneous execution of a large 
class of queries.   
To apply this algorithm, one needs to first triangulate the Bayesian belief networks, and 
then build the junction tree.  After that, initialization and global propagation are applied. 
If there are evidences entering the network, the set evidence and normalization step are 






Figure 20: The junction tree algorithm flow chart 
 
This algorithm has the following steps: 
Step 1: Convert the Bayesian belief network into a corresponding moral graph, which is 
an undirected graph in which each variable X and its parents are linked pairwise. The 
moral graph GM corresponding to a Bayesian belief network G is constructed by copying 
G, discarding the directions of the links, and then ensuring for all variables in G that links 














Step 2:  Triangulate the moral graph GM, by adding links to the graph until all cycles 
consisting of more than three links contain a link between two nonadjacent nodes in the 
cycle. Specifically, a triangulated graph can be constructed by creating a copy GT of GM. 
While nodes are left in GT, select a node from GT. Connect all nodes in the cluster formed 
by the selected node and its neighbors, by adding links to GT and creating corresponding 
links in GM. Remove the selected node from GT. 
Step 3:  Identify the cliques in GM, which are the subgraphs that are both complete, 
meaning that each pair of nodes is connected by a link, and maximal, meaning that the 
clique is not part of a larger complete subgraph.  Cliques are identified during the 
triangulation of GM (step 2), by saving each cluster that is not also included in a 
previously saved cluster. 
Step 4:  Construct the junction tree GJ by connecting the cliques obtained in step 3 such 
that the resulting tree satisfies the junction tree property.  Start out with a set of trees, 
each consisting of a single clique.  Create candidate separators for each pair of cliques in 
GM. Then select a candidate separator, and remove it from the pool of candidate 
separators.  If the cliques corresponding to the candidate separator belong to different 
trees, connect the trees by inserting the separator between the cliques. Repeat until a 
single tree remains. 
The order in which candidate separators are selected must be such that the separators with 
the largest number of variables in the intersection are selected first.  If two or more 
candidate separators have the same number of variables, select the separator that connects 
cliques for which the sum of the number of configurations is smallest. 
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Comparing conditioning methods with the junction tree method, the junction tree method 
transforms the network into a probabilistically equivalent, but topologically different 
polytree by merging the offending nodes; conditioning methods do the transformation by 
instantiating variables to definite values, and then evaluating a polytree for each possible 
instantiation. 
3.5 Bayesian Belief Network Scale Capability 
Bayesian belief networks consisting of more than one thousand nodes are not uncommon.  
For example in Quick Medical Reference (QMR-DT) network there are more than 4000 
nodes [Shwe et al., 1991].  QMR-DT is a two-level or bi-partite graphical model. The top 
level of the graph contains nodes for the diseases, and the bottom level contains nodes for 
the symptom.  This is shown in Figure 21 as diseases and findings. 
 









3.6 Bayesian Belief Network Application 
Bayesian belief networks have been widely applied, especially in the field of artificial 
intelligence, including such applications as medical diagnosis [Heckerman 1990], a 
variety of Microsoft product’s help systems [Horvitz, Breese, Heckerman, 1998], 
intelligent tutoring, and troubleshooting.  Recently, it has been used for risk assessment 
and root cause analysis in the field of civil engineering and for application in software 
reliability estimation. 
An appealing application of Bayesian belief networks in the area of probabilistic risk 
assessment is in their integration with the main modeling methods of PRA, namely the 
event sequence diagram (or alternatively even trees) and fault tress. For this purpose a 
full set of integrating algorithms need to be developed. This is the core of this dissertation.  
We will first review some possible options.   
3.6.1 Fault Trees Converted to Bayesian Belief Networks 
A the Bayesian belief network structure can also represent the logic of fault trees, and  
serve as method for solving (quantifying) fault trees. By extension a hybrid causal model 
of Bayesian belief networks and fault trees can be solved by converting the fault tree into 
an equivalent Bayesian belief network. Essentially Bayesian belief networks can be seen 
as the generalization of the fault trees, since Bayesian belief networks can handle 
multiple states, and deterministic analysis is a special case of probabilistic analysis.  A 
FT-to-BBN mapping method has been described by [Bobbio et al., 1999] and [Bobbio et 




Figure 23 shows how fault trees can be modeled by using Bayesian belief networks in 
the case of the AND, and OR gates.  The proof presented is slightly different from 
Bobbio’s proof .  
(a) Bayesian belief network equivalent of OR Gate. 









Figure 22: Fault tree OR gate mapping to Bayesian belief network 
 
For a Bayesian belief network to be equivalent to the OR gate, conditional probability 



















In the fault tree, the Boolean expression will be C = A + B.  We may infer that 
)Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr( BABAC −+= if A and B are assumed to be statistically 
independent. 
















)Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr()Pr( BABAC −+=  
(b)Bayesian belief network equivalent of AND Gate 
 
 









Figure 23: AND Gate and BBN Equivalent 
 



















In fault trees, the Boolean expression will be C = AB; then the probability can be  
)Pr()Pr()Pr( BAC =  if A and B are assumed statistically independent. 
In Bayesian belief network,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








The K-out-of-N gate modeling process is similar.  
3.6.2 Attaching Bayesian Belief Networks to Fault Tree Basic 
Events 
An approach to combining fault tree analysis and Bayesian belief networks has been 
shown in Pai and Dugan’s work [Pai and Dugan, 2001] in the context of software 
reliability modeling (see Figure 24).  The paper presents linking individual basic events 
to separate Bayesian belief networks; in other words, one node in the Bayesian belief 
networks serves as the basic event in the fault tree.  The limitation is that the BBNs 
attached to various basic events cannot have common nodes, a condition that is difficult 
















Figure 24: The Bayesian belief network serves one basic event in the fault tree 
 
 48
3.6.3 Modeling Event Trees using Bayesian Belief Networks  
The following algorithm for modeling event trees using Bayesian belief networks was 
developed in this research.  In general, an event tree can be converted into a Bayesian 
belief network without losing any information.  Since the top events in event trees are 
usually dependent, Bayesian belief networks can show the dependency more 
transparently.   
The procedure to model event trees using Bayesian belief networks is to define a node in 
a Bayesian belief network for each event in event trees with the respective conditional 
probability table obtained from the event tree: 
1. For the initiating event in the event tree, create a root node in the Bayesian 
belief network, and assign the prior probability of the initiating event to this root 
node.  
2. For each event in the event tree, create a corresponding leaf node in the 
Bayesian belief network. 
3. Connect the nodes in corresponding order in the event tree.  
4. Assign the equivalent conditional probability table in corresponding order to the 
conditional probability in the event tree. 
The process is illustrated through the following example of Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
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Figure 25: The event tree to be mapped into Bayesian belief network 
Figure 25 shows a typical event tree with dependency between the events.  As a 
numerical example, the quantification of Scenario 6 is shown below. 

















The probability of the scenario will be 2.6268E-8. The corresponding BBN is shown in 







Figure 26: The Bayesian belief network mapped from Figure 25 
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The conditional probability table (Table 2) is assigned according to the conditional 






I A P(A|I) 
0 0 0.003 
0 1 0.997 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
 
I A B P(B|I, A) 
0 0 0 0.005 
0 0 1 0.995 
0 1 0 0.008 
0 1 1 0.992 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
 
 
I A B C P(C|I, A, B) 
0 0 0 0 0.06 
0 0 0 1 0.94 
0 0 1 0 0.005 
0 0 1 1 0.945 
0 1 0 0 0.033 
0 1 0 1 0.967 
0 1 1 0 0.06 
0 1 1 1 0.94 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
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1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
 
I A B C D P(D|I, A, B, 
C) 
0 0 0 0 0 0.06 
0 0 0 0 1 0.94 
0 0 0 1 0 0.05 
0 0 0 1 1 0.95 
0 0 1 0 0 0.08 
0 0 1 0 1 0.92 
0 0 1 1 0 0.011 
0 0 1 1 1 0.989 
0 1 0 0 0 0.05 
0 1 0 0 1 0.95 
0 1 0 1 0 0.08 
0 1 0 1 1 0.92 
0 1 1 0 0 0.1 
0 1 1 0 1 0.9 
0 1 1 1 0 0.06 
0 1 1 1 1 0.94 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 2: Conditional probability table for mapping the example event tree to equivalent 
Bayesian belief network 
In Bayesian belief networks, Scenario 6 operates by querying the joint probability: 
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4. Hybrid Causal Logic Methodology and Algorithm 
We have defined the combination of event trees/event sequence diagrams, fault trees and 
Bayesian belief networks as Hybrid Causal Logic diagram.  In a Hybrid Causal Logic 
diagram, Bayesian belief networks can be used to model the basic events in the fault trees 
or the pivotal events in the event tree. The various BBNs can have common nodes. The 
combination can be made at any level to build a Hybrid Causal Logic diagram (see 
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Figure 27: An example Hybrid Causal Logic diagram 
The hybrid process can include: (1) Bayesian belief networks modeling the basic event in 
fault trees, for example the node A, C in Figure 27; (2) Bayesian belief networks 
modeling the pivotal event in the event sequence diagram, for example the node Pivotal 3 
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in Figure 27; (3) furthermore, the fault tree top event can model the root node in the 
Bayesian belief network. 
4.1 The Nature of the Dependency in HCL Diagrams 
What makes the combination (hybrid model) of complicated is the dependency 
introduced by the link in the fault tree context, or the loop introduced by the link in 
Bayesian belief networks (see Figure 28). 
                         
Figure 28: The Loop introduced in the combination of fault trees and Bayesian belief 
networks 
By putting everything into a Bayesian belief network the dependency becomes obvious.  
The loop as seen in Figure 28 will introduce the double counting in the networks. There 
are three loops, one is A, X, Y, OR, the second is A, Y, OR, Z, AND, and the third one is 
A, X, OR, Z, AND.  According to Weiss’s research, Pearl’s message-passing algorithm 










become problematic, especially when the probability is very small. The double counting 
will cause errors in the output.   
The following example (Figure 29) will show the difference between the case where one 
considers the dependency and the case where dependency is ignored.  As seen in Figure 
29, the fault tree basic events A, B are modeled by a BBN. The prior and conditional 






Figure 29: The Bayesian belief network and fault tree for dependency analysis example 
 
P(C) (Prior probability of C) 




P(A|C) (Conditional probability table of A) 
C A P(A|C) 
0 0 0.95 
0 1 0.05 
 
 57
1 0 0.1 
1 1 0.9 
 
P(B|C) (Conditional probability table of B) 
C B P(B|C) 
0 0 0.95 
0 1 0.05 
1 0 0.60 
1 1 0.10 
 
Table 3: Prior and conditional probability tables for dependency analysis example 
 
Only considering the Bayesian belief network itself, after running the Bayesian belief 
networks inference algorithm, we get 0585.0)( =AP  0535.0)( =BP , and if we do not 
consider the dependency, the fault tree top event probability will be  
P(Top Event) = 00312975.00535.00585.0 =×  
In contrast, if we apply the Hybrid Causal Logic algorithm to eliminate the dependency, 
the result will be 0.006075.  (The same result is obtained when we convert the Bayesian 
belief network and fault tree in Figure 29 to a single Bayesian belief network.)  
Therefore ignoring the dependency can lead to significant errors.  
 
In this research, two HCL algorithms are developed based on different Bayesian belief 
network inference algorithms. (1) Based on the conditioning algorithm, the refined 
conditioning algorithm converts the combination to a Bayesian belief network and breaks 
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the loop in order to do the quantification. (2) Based on the variable elimination or 
junction tree algorithm, the iterative algorithm sets the evidence sequentially in the 
Bayesian belief network; this is done to quantify the posterior probability of the 
intersectional nodes between the fault tree and Bayesian belief network.   
4.2 Role of Binary Decision Diagram in Hybrid Causal Logic 
Solution 
In developing the Hybrid Causal Logic solution procedure, the binary decision diagram 
method is utilized.  The reason for adopting the binary decision diagram is that, in 
Bayesian belief networks, the inference is probabilistic.  That means the negated part also 
plays an important role in the qualitative analysis.  The IF-THEN-ELSE [Rauzy and Dutit, 
1997] engine in the binary decision diagram does consider the negated part.  This is one 
reason why we use binary decision diagrams to quantify fault trees in Hybrid Causal 
Logic diagram.  This means the common (intersectional) nodes, which are both in the 
Bayesian belief network and fault trees/ event sequence diagrams, can be well quantified. 
Additionally, binary decision diagram has been proven a very efficient way to represent 
and quantify Boolean logic. 
4.3 The Refined Conditioning Method 
This new method is based on conditioning algorithm for Bayesian belief networks.  The 
algorithm refines the conditioning algorithm to ensure the message (information/evidence) 
passes exactly from the Bayesian belief network to fault trees or event trees.  The 
conditioning propagation method in Bayesian belief networks was developed to break a 
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loop into a polytree [Pearl, 1986-1].  The conditioning method consists of instantiating a 
variable and thereby blocking the information path. For a directed, acyclic graph 




aXPXP ),()( if A is instantiated to the state a [Pearl, 
1981] [Diez, 1996].  The basic approach is to treat the intersectional node in the Bayesian 
belief network as a cut set, instantiate it, and perform the summation in the intersectional 
part. In the intersectional part of fault trees (or event sequence diagram) and Bayesian 
belief networks, the conditioning method will prevent the information from double 
counting when a message passes from Bayesian belief networks to fault trees or event 
sequence diagram through a different route. When applying the conditioning method, the 
conditional independence property has been assumed. After breaking the loop, the 
procedure is the same as the variable elimination method.  The refined conditioning 
algorithm does not need to convert the entire fault trees and event sequence diagrams to 
Bayesian belief networks.  This improves efficiency and keeps the conventional 
probabilistic risk assessment infrastructure.  The heuristic algorithm is used to set the 
boundary of summation where the variables in the BDD accept the message 
(information/evidence) from the Bayesian belief network and have the potential 
interaction.   
For a Bayesian belief network singly connected to a fault tree (the BBN only links to one 
fault tree basic event), one can simply take the BBN node probability for the state 
corresponding to the meaning of the event in the fault tree (e.g., failure) as the probability 
of the basic event of the fault tree. 
If the Bayesian belief network is multiply connected to fault trees, the quantification 
procedure is as follows:  
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1. Convert the fault tree to a binary decision diagram. 
2. Identify the intersectional node position. 
3. If there is more than one intersectional node, apply Refined Conditioning 
Algorithm. 
4. If not, continue Binary Decision Diagram recursive computation. 
5. END 
The general approach for the Refined Conditioning Algorithm is: 
 
Where B is the intersectional node in the Bayesian belief network, )|( BFTP is the 
conditional probability table over the intersectional nodes in ...},,{ ZYXFT .  The detail 
steps are described below using Figure 30. 
The BDD sub-graph ),,( 01 αααα ITE= , depends on B if α directly depends on B, or 1α , 
or 0α depends on B.  The Figure 30 shows the refined conditioning algorithm 

















1) Given sub-graph 01,, ααα in BDD over B in BBN with ))(|( ii XParentXP  
(conditional probability table for the intersectional nodes in binary decision 
diagram part), 
0101 ),,( ααααααα +=F  
2) Ifα , or 1α , or 0α  depends on B (B is parent of 01 αααα + ) 
a. Cluster the variables inα , or 1α , or 0α together to be a single expression 
b. Multiply the conditional probability table into the F expression 
c. Apply the conditioning method to compute respective joint probability 




















),,((),,(Pr( 0101 αααααα FPF statefailure=   
3) Else 
)Pr(),,(Pr( 0101 ααααααα +=F  
4) Store the result in the table to α node 
5) Recursive F 
The above is the Refined Conditioning Algorithm for quantifying the Hybrid Causal 
Logic.  The HCL diagram of Figure 31 is used to illustrate the method. The 












A X P(X|A) 
0 0 0.5 
0 1 0.5 






1 1 0.9 
 
A Y P(Y|A) 
0 0 0.4 
0 1 0.6 
1 0 0.2 
1 1 0.8 
 
A Z P(Z|A) 
0 0 0.75 
0 1 0.25 
1 0 0.25 
1 1 0.75 
 
Table 4: Prior and conditional probability table for showing the Figure 31 Refined 
















The quantification for Figure 31 is as follows:  
The Boolean expression for the fault tree is  
YZXXZ +  














( True indicates   xand False  indicates  xHere  10 )  








This result is the same as that obtained by converting the hybrid diagram in Figure 31 to a 
single Bayesian belief network.  Because of the potential interaction between the nodes 
that receive message (information/evidence) from the Bayesian belief network, it is 
crucial to group them together to the extent possible near the top in the reduced ordered 
binary decision diagram (ROBDD).  The order is critical in the reduced ordered binary 
decision diagram [Bryant, 1992][Bartlett and Andrews, 1999].  Improving the variable 
ordering of ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) is NP-Complete [Bolling and 
Wegener, 1996].  Some heuristic algorithms, and a comparison of them, have been 
provided in [Bartlett and Andrews, 2001][Fujita et al., 1988][Minato et al., 
1991][Boussiou, 1996] as well as for Bayesian belief networks when applying the 
variable elimination algorithm.  
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In Bayesian belief networks, finding an optimal elimination ordering is NP-Complete too 
[Arnborg et al., 1987], and some heuristic algorithms have been developed, such as 
minimum deficiency search [Bertel and Brioschi, 1972] and maximum cardinality search 
[Tarjan and Yannakakis, 1984]. 
In the variable order process, grouping variables that accept the impact from Bayesian 
networks inα , or 1α , or 0α  is crucial in order for the summation to work efficiently.  In 
addition, grouping all of these variables in the top is a practical way to improve the 
summation efficiency and accuracy. This means that if these variables are far away, the 
recursive searching will take a long time and the summation scale will be very large.  
4.4 The Iterative Method 
In this algorithm, we first convert fault trees to binary decision diagrams, and apply the 
IF-THEN-ELSE engine [Rauzy and Dutit, 1997]  to get the Boolean logic expression.  In 
the numerical computation, in any Boolean logic expression, if there is more than one 
event is in the Bayesian belief network, then the second one should take the posterior 
probability after the first one is set to evidence.  The reason is to make them conditionally 
independent.  This must be done iteratively. The reason is that when we perform the 
quantification in the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram, except for the first intersectional node 
the following nodes are updated based on the previous nodes being instantiated, as the 
nodes are not independent.  The probability of the visiting node depends on its ancestors’ 
states. When any node is visited, it is instantiated to the fail or success state depending on 
the binary decision diagram branch to which it belongs.  When converting fault trees to 
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binary decision diagrams, it is also critical to put the intersectional nodes close together 
in the graph. This improves computational efficiency. 













Using the probabilities listed in Table 4 in the above equation, the same numeric result 
(0.070091) is obtained.  
The above two algorithms provide a heuristic way to quantify the Hybrid Causal Logic 
diagram.  The following section will provide the detail of the quantification procedure 
that has been implemented in the IRIS software [Groth 2007] for quantification of the 
Hybrid Causal Logic models.  
 
Compared with the Refined Conditioning Algorithm, from Graph Theory, the iterative 
algorithm is based on the variable elimination method (Junction tree is its time and space 
efficient version) and the graph is not divided.  In Refined Conditioning algorithm, the 
graph is divided into multiple graphs at the cut set of the graph, which will break the loop 
to the polygraph.  The strength of the Refined Conditioning algorithm is inherited from 
the conditioning algorithm in the Bayesian belief networks. The polytree algorithm can 
be directly applied.  The limitation is due to the complexity when cutting the graph to 
multiple graphs, the optimized path to cut the graph is a NP-problem.  The strength of the 
Iterative algorithm is inherited from the variable elimination algorithm, the graph doesn’t 
have to be cut to multiple graphs, that is space efficient.  The limitation is the optimizing 
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order to eliminate the variable is a NP-problem and requiring more times to do the 
calculation compared with Refined Conditioning algorithm. 
4.5 Hybrid Causal Logic Quantification Algorithm  
4.5.1 Computational Rule 
The following algorithm is a joint contribution with another researcher, and subject of a 
US patent application. [Mosleh, Wang, Groen, 2006] 
This algorithm uses the binary decision diagram IF-THEN-ELSE engine [Rauzy and 
Dutit, 1997].  In implementation, variable L is used to provide the stopping rule, where 
the hybrid recursive will stop to apply the standard binary decision diagram qualification 
rule.  
Define a function f, which computes the probability of α conditional on L 
( , ) Pr( | )f L Lα α= . 
Here f can be written in the form of a recursive equation 
1 0( , ) Pr( | ) ( , ) (1 Pr( | )) ( , )f L x L f L x x L f L xα α α= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅  
corresponding to the probabilistic decomposition, 
1 0Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( | )L x L L x x L L xα α α= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ . 
Here, L x⋅  denotes the logical union of L and x. In case α equals 1 (true), f returns 1. In 
case α equals 0 (false), f returns 0.  When the binary decision diagram is a standard, non-
hybrid binary decision diagram, Pr( | ) Pr( )Lα α= . 
 Input Condition (α,L) Output f(α,L) 
1 0α =  0 
2 1α =  1 
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3 α is non-hybrid, L ≠ ∅  ( , )f α ∅  
4 (α,L) in computed table Pr(α,L) (pre-computed) 
5 X is independent 
1 0Pr( ) ( , ) (1 Pr( )) ( , )x f L x f Lα α⋅ + − ⋅  
6 X is dependent 
1 0Pr( | ) ( , ) (1 Pr( | )) ( , )x L f L x x L f L xα α⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅  
 
Table 5:  The Hybrid Causal Logic Implementation Rule 
 
Here, if the variable X associated with a binary decision diagram node α is independent; f 
can be computed more efficiently as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )L,fxPr1L,fxPrL,f 01 α⋅−+α⋅=α  
taking advantage of the fact that X does not depend on any other variable 
 ( ) ( )xPrLxPr =  
nor does any other variable depend on X 
( ) ( ) ( )LyPrxLyPrxLyPr =⋅=⋅  
This makes L to include only the necessary conditions.  This speeds up the computation 
by increasing the chance that f(α, L) can return a previously computed probability value. 
Since in the BBNs nodes often have multiple states, expressions such as xy |  are not 
adequate.  Instead expressions such as ...),,,,,0(|1 EDCBAxy ==  are more 
representative. Therefore, in the above equation, x  means xX = , xmeans xX = , the 
variable in L is set to a specific state according to the path where the binary decision 
diagram goes to this variable X.  Those BBN variables not in the path are set to “un-
instantiated”. 
Figure 33 presents an overview of the major procedural steps required for the 








Convert BBN to Junction Tree 




Figure 33: Major procedural steps in the quantification of Hybrid Causal Models 
 
The procedure above does not pose any specific constraints on the variable order in the 
binary decision diagram.  However, it is believed that from a computational standpoint, it 
is generally advantageous to place dependent variables together in the variable order, as it 
minimizes the number of binary decision diagram nodes that need to be quantified for 
multiple conditions L. 
An additional ordering applies in case where the binary decision diagram variables are 
spread over multiple smaller Bayesian belief networks, rather than being connected by a 
single, large Bayesian belief network.  In this case, only the variables within each graph 
depend on each other.  The grouping of such variables in the variable ordering is likely to 
result in a faster quantification procedure. 
For instance, consider a binary decision diagram with variables X, Y, V, W.  Let 
variables X and Y be connected by one Bayesian belief network, and variables V and W 
be connected by another.  If we apply the variable ordering X, Y, V, W, we see that any 
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binary decision diagram node with variable V or W is not dependent on variables X or Y.  
When quantifying these nodes, X and Y can thus be removed from the condition L 
( ) { }( )Y,XLPrLPr W,VW,V α=α  
As explained before, limiting L to include only the necessary conditions increases the 
chance that a previous probability value can be used, resulting in faster computations.  
The reduction would however not be possible in case of a variable order such as X, V, W, 
Y. 
Once the binary decision diagram variable order is established, a determination must be 
made for each position in the order, of the set of variables higher in the order on which 
the variable in the selected position or any variables lower in the order depend.  When 
computing f(α|L), L is then filtered by removing any variable not in the set. The filtering 
operation replaces condition 3 in the procedure of  
Table 5. 
Stronger filtering, and thus additional speed optimizations, would be possible by 
determining the filter sets for individual binary decision diagram nodes rather than binary 
decision diagram variables, but this would significantly increase the memory required to 
store each binary decision diagram node. 
Ordering rules for hybrid structures is a topic of additional investigation, which could 




4.5.2 Constructing Binary Decision Diagrams in Hybrid Causal 
Logic Diagram 
This section includes a procedure for the construction of binary decision diagrams.  The 
procedure follows well-known procedures [Bryant (1992)]. 
Let us define a binary decision diagram node ( )10 ,,X αα∆=α α  as denoting the 
statement 
If (Xα = xα) then α0 else α1 
Nodes α1 and α0 are either BDD nodes as defined above, or 0 (false) or 1 (true) terminals.  
We define the recursive procedure APPLY(α,β,op) for BDD nodes α and β and logical 
operation op. op can be such operations as AND, OR, and XOR, NOR and NAND.  For 
cases where no trivial solutions exist, i.e., where neither α nor β is a terminal node (true 
or false), the following rules are used 
Input Condition α, β APPLY(α, β, op) 
Xα > Xβ ( ) ( )[ ]op,,xAPPLYop,,xAPPLY,X βαβα∆ ααα  
Xα < Xβ ( ) ( )[ ]op,x,APPLYop,x,APPLY,X βββ βαβα∆  
Xα = Xβ = X ( ) ( )[ ]op,x,xAPPLY,op ,x,xAPPLY,X βαβα∆  
 
Table 6: Constructing the binary decision diagram including dependent variables 
 
In this table, Xα > Xβ and Xα < Xβ refer to an ordering of variables in the model which 
must be established in advance using an appropriate ordering heuristic. A simple heuristic 




.x  and  x 01 α=αα=α αα  
A binary decision diagram corresponding to a fault tree is then constructed by 
successively applying the APPLY operation in order to construct the binary decision 
diagrams corresponding to all fault tree gates, starting at the lowest-level gates.  Each 
basic event in the fault tree is represented by a corresponding binary decision diagram 
∆(X, 0, 1).  Binary decision diagrams corresponding to k-out-of-n gates are constructed 
using the following procedure in Table 7: 
For i = (n – k + 1) to 1 step –1 
for j = k to 1 step –1 
βi, j = Apply[OR, Apply(AND, αi + j - 1, βi, j + 1), βi + j, 1] 
where βn – k + 2, j = 0 and  βi, k + 1 = 1 
 
Table 7: The rule constructing K-out-of-N gates in binary decision diagram 
 
A binary decision diagram need to be created for each risk scenario represented by the 
occurrence of an initiating event, a sequence of occurrences and negations of pivotal 
events, and an end state, where fault trees are used to specify the conditions under which 
the pivotal event do or do not take place. The binary decision diagram representing the 
scenario logic is then found by combining the binary decision diagram obtained for the 




4.5.3 Quantification of Dependent Variables 
In this discussion, no consideration has so far been given to the computation of 
conditional probabilities Pr(x|L) for dependent variables.  Within the context of the 
quantification of Hybrid Causal Logic diagram, the quantification of these variables 
corresponds to the computation of marginal distributions, which is a standard operation 
for Bayesian belief networks, where L acts as the set of observations for which the 
network must be conditioned.   
The selection of a Bayesian belief network solution method must consider that the 
Bayesian belief network will need to be solved a high number of times.  Furthermore, 
only minor modifications of L should be expected between subsequent quantifications. 
For instance, the computation of Pr(x|L) is likely to be followed by a computation of 
Pr( | )y L x⋅  or Pr( | )y L x⋅ .  
The number of quantifications can be reduced by storing computed probabilities in the 
table of computed values.  For this purpose, each dependent variable X can be encoded 
using a corresponding binary decision diagram node αX = ∆(X, 0, 1), such that the 
conditional probabilities for variables can also be indexed by α and L. 
We note however that the procedure of  
Table 5 is not limited to the quantification of Hybrid Causal Logic diagrams, and can 
generally be applied to problems in which the events in the Boolean logic models 
(variables in the binary decision diagram) are dependent, as long as the conditional 
marginal probabilities of the dependent variables can be found. 
As stated above the quantification procedures described requires the repeated 
quantification of dependent variables, i.e., those variables in the binary decision diagram 
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that also appear as variables in the Bayesian belief networks.  The quantification of these 
variables corresponds to the propagation of evidence in a Bayesian belief network in 
order to compute marginal probability distributions, which is a standard operation in 
Bayesian belief network theory.  
4.5.4 An Example 
This example is the same as in the Figure 31. The computational rule is applied step by 
step here. The graph is re-drawn as in Figure 34 complying with all the computational 





















Figure 34: The Hybrid Causal Logic diagram (left) and corresponding hybrid binary 
decision diagram and Bayesian belief network structure 
 
Quantification of this structure requires the following steps: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )



















By making the appropriate substitutions, we find that the procedure decomposes Pr(α) 
into   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xzxxyzxyx PrPr,PrPrPrPr ⋅+⋅⋅=α  
This equation can be reduced to the expected result 








even though variables X, Y, and Z are dependent.  The conditional marginal probabilities 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xzPr and,xPr ,xyzPr ,xyPr ,xPr  follow from the Bayesian belief network 
(X, Y, Z, A).  
Based on these probabilities, the top event probability is computed as 
( )













Pr( )x  0.89992 
Pr( | )y x  0.200022 
),|Pr( xyz  0.250111 
Pr( )x  0.10008 
Pr( | )z x  0.2505 
 
Table 8: Conditional probability obtained from the corresponding Bayesian belief network 
(X, Y, Z, A) 
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This result is the same as that obtained by converting the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram to 

















A X P(X|A) 
0 0 0.5 
0 1 0.5 
1 0 0.1 




A Y P(Y|A) 
0 0 0.4 
0 1 0.6 
1 0 0.2 
1 1 0.8 
 
 
A Z P(Z|A) 
0 0 0.75 
0 1 0.25 
1 0 0.25 
1 1 0.75 
 
X Y OR P(OR|X,Y) 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
 
X Y AND P(AND|X,Y) 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
 
 
Table 9: The prior and conditional probability table for the Bayesian belief network in 
Figure 35 
4.6 Hybrid Causal Logic Quantification Algorithm with 
Evidence Observed 
In the previous section, the quantification algorithm for the Hybrid Causal Logic was 
described.  In this section, we extend the procedure for propagation of the impact of 
observing evidence in a Bayesian belief network node of the Hybrid Causal Logic 




1. Apply the junction tree algorithm to the Bayesian belief network.    
a) Moralize: Pair all the parents and remove all the arrows. 
b) Triangulate: Add arcs to the nodes to give every cycle with more than four 
nodes a chord/arc. 
c) Identify cliques and separators. 
d) Build the junction tree. 
e) Initialization: Each clique or separator in the junction tree has an 
associated table over the configurations of its constituent variables. For 
each node X, choose one clique Y in the junction tree that contains X and 
all of X’s parents, Multiply ))(|( XParentsXP  on Y’s table. 
f) Evidence entry: Evidence is added and propagated into the junction tree. 
g) Marginalize and normalize the variable. 
2. After updating the Bayesian belief network, save the parameters of each 
variable for use in the next step. 
3. Keep the evidence in the Bayesian belief network and run the Hybrid Causal 
Logic diagram quantification algorithm.  
Example: Consider the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram of Figure 36.  The binary decision 
diagram of the fault tree portion is shown in Figure 37.  The probability values of the  
















































State of P State of O P(O|P) 
0 0 0.8 
0 1 0.2 
1 0 0.6 
1 1 0.4 
 
State of O State of M P(M|O) 
0 0 0.8 
0 1 0.2 
1 0 0.3 
1 1 0.7 
 
State of O State of N P(N|O) 
0 0 0.9 
0 1 0.1 
1 0 0.2 





State of M State of N State of C P(C|M,N) 
0 0 0 0.9 
0 0 1 0.1 
0 1 0 0.6 
0 1 1 0.4 
1 0 0 0.7 
1 0 1 0.3 
1 1 0 0.1 
1 1 1 0.9 
 
State of M State of B P(B|M) 
0 0 0.7 
0 1 0.3 
1 0 0.2 
1 1 0.8 
 
State of M State of A P(A|M) 
0 0 0.6 
0 1 0.4 
1 0 0.3 
1 1 0.7 
 




Evidence Scenario 1: The evidence is observed on the root nodes or the intermediate 
nodes between the fault tree nodes and root nodes.  Set evidence as N= 1, P= 0 which 
means that the probability that N is in state 1 is 1, and probability that P in state 0 is 1. 
By applying the binary decision diagram IF-THEN-ELSE engine, the equation for the 
BDD in Figure 37 will be:  
BCAAC +  











After adding the evidence in the Bayesian belief networks, and based on the values in 























This result is the same as when the whole HCL diagram is converted to the equivalent 












Figure 38: The corresponding Bayesian belief network 
 
Evidence Scenario 2: The evidence is observed on the intersectional nodes, which are 
the basic events in the fault tree and a node in the BBN at the same time.  We set the 
evidence as C=1, and M=0, which means the probability of C being in state 1 is 1, and 
the probability of M being in state 0 is 1. 
By applying the binary decision diagram IF-THEN-ELSE engine, the equation for the 
BDD in Figure 37 will be  
BCAAC +  
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Again, the result is the same as for the case where the HCL diagram is converted to the 
BBN of Figure 38 and inference is ran with the corresponding evidence.  
Some specific cases: 
The process of adding evidence can lead to some conflicts.  For example, in some cases, 
when evidence is set on a node, its child will be specified.  The child will not be allowed 
to be given any evidence.  In this situation, when the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram 
quantifies, the value taken from the child variable will be the same value as specified by 




5. Importance Measure in Hybrid Causal Logic 
5.1 Importance Measurement 
By using importance measures PRA analyst can rank scenarios and identify the most 
important contributors in order to improve reliability or to reduce risk. Because of the 
dependency brought about by the Bayesian belief networks (common BBN nodes shared 
by FT basic events of ESD pivotal events, the conventional importance definition needs 
to be redefined in the Hybrid Causal Logic scenario and the measurement method needs 
to be redeveloped.  Two conventional importance measures are adopted here.  One is the 
risk achievement worth (RAW) [Modarres et. Al, 1999]; the other is Vesely-Fussel 
importance factor (VF) [Fussel 1975].  
Risk achievement worth is also called risk increase factor.  RAW measures the increase 
in system failure probability assuming failure of a component.  It is an indicator of the 







eSRAW =  
Vesely-Fussel importance factor [Fussel 1975] indicates the part of the total system 
failure probability that involves the component failure.  VF is defined as:  
)|Pr(),( SeeSVF =  















5.1.1 Procedure for Risk Achievement Worth Quantification in 
Hybrid Causal Logic 
In the following procedure, we need to traverse the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram twice 
to obtain the importance measures of a given component e.  In this process, the 
dependency caused by the BBN nodes is eliminated by applying the following procedure.   
The first step is to compute the top event probability from the basic events probabilities, 
which is done in a binary decision diagram by applying the IF-THEN-ELSE engine.  If 
the basic events are in a BBN, the Bayesian belief network inference algorithm is called 
and the dependency is eliminated by applying the Hybrid Causal Logic quantification 
algorithms described in previous sections. .  The quantification is done from bottom to 
top.   
In this importance measurement procedure, the dependency of the dependent variables 
(referring to the variables in both the BBN and fault trees or event sequence diagrams) 
must be counted between themselves and their children. 
In Bayesian belief networks, the assumption that the probability of “failed state” of one 
node is equal to 1 automatically impacts children nodes due to the conditional probability 
relationship between the node and its children.  The probabilities of children nodes will 
be changed. This needs to be taken into account in Hybrid Causal Logic because this 
change will influence HCL output results.  It is counted in the computation when 
quantifying the )|Pr( eS . 
The methodology is, first of all, to always set the component failing state equal to 1; then 
run the BBN inference algorithm one time and put the probabilities of each node in the 
array for the next use of the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram traverse.  
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The procedure is summarized in the following:  
1. Find Pr(S) by traversing the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram once. 
2. Assuming component e fails, if e is in the Bayesian belief network part of the 
HCL, assume e failing state probability is 1; propagate the BBN one time and 
store the intermediate probability in an array for use in the second Hybrid Causal 
Logic diagram traverse; marking this variable e/component e to keep its failing 
state in the second Hybrid Causal Logic diagram quantification traverse; if not, go 
directly to the next step. 
3. Find )|Pr( eS by traversing the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram again. 






5.1.2 Procedure for Vesely-Fussel Importance Factor 
Quantification in HCL  
For this measure, we need to traverse the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram twice to obtain 
the importance measures of component e. As with risk achievement worth quantification, 
the dependent variables referring to the variables in the Bayesian belief network must be 
considered first. The solution is to first run the Bayesian belief network inference 
algorithm one time and then put the probabilities of each node in the array for the next 
Hybrid Causal Logic diagram traverse. 
The Vesely-Fussel importance measurement procedure is summarized in following:  
1. Find Pr(S) by traversing Hybrid Causal Logic diagram one time. 
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2. Assuming component e fails, if e is in the Bayesian belief network, and assuming 
component e failing state probability is 1, propagate the Bayesian belief network 
one time and store the intermediate probability in an array for use in the second 
Hybrid Causal Logic diagram traverse, marking this variable e/component e to 
keep its failing state in the second Hybrid Causal Logic diagram quantification 
traverse; if not, go directly to next step. 
3. Find )|Pr( eS  by traversing Hybrid Causal Logic diagram again. 







Consider a fault tree including five basic events A, B, C, D, E; two of the events D, E are 
modeled by a Bayesian belief network (Figure 39). Table 11 is the conditional probability 

































Conditional probability of node M 
P T F 
T 0.8 0.75 
F 0.2 0.25 
 




Conditional probability of node N 
P T F 
Q T F T F 
T 0.9 0.65 0.55 0.1 




Conditional probability of node K 
M T F 
N T F T F 
T 0.99 0.6 0.3 0.02 
F 0.01 0.4 0.7 0.98 
 
Conditional probability of node D 
K T F 
T 0.95 0.2 
F 0.05 0.8 
 
Conditional probability of node E 
K T F 
T 0.8 0.1 
F 0.2 0.9 
 




e Pr(S|e) V-F RAW 
A 0.506689 0.145296 1.45296 
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B 0.410566 0.235464 1.17732 
C 0.366413 0.315214 1.05071 
D 0.86096 0.951995 2.46885 
E 0.654419 0.963118 1.87658 
K 0.73424 0.942137 2.10548 
M 0.674701 0.464339 1.93474 
N 0.415021 0.891384 1.1901 
P 0.380103 0.871975 1.08997 
Q 0.359118 0.926812 1.02979 
 
Table 12: The Importance Measurement Analysis Result 
 
Table 12 gives the importance measurement results for all the components in the Hybrid 










6. The Safety Performance Indicator in Hybrid Causal 
Logic 
6.1 Definition 
Various elements of an HCL risk model can be viewed as Safety Performance Indicator 
(SI). For example failure of a major system (pivotal event of an ESD), or failure of a 
component of that system  (a basic event of the corresponding FT), or poor maintenance 
quality (as basic node of a BBN that covers human and organizational causal factors) 
could used as SPIs . Normally the frequency of observing these events can be viewed as 
an indicator of level of safety or risk. The level of risk can be obtained as the product of 
the frequency of the SI and the conditional probability an undesired end state of the 
system given the occurrence of that SI.   
Therefore safety performance indicators can be a Bayesian belief network root node, a 
fault tree basic event, a fault tree intermediate event, a fault tree top event, or an event 
sequence diagram pivotal event.  In the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram, the safety 
performance indicator is selected by the user or decision maker according to some 
considerations such as ease of monitoring the frequency of the SI.  
As stated earlier, each safety performance indicator has a frequency and risk weight value.  
The frequency is input by the user when building the diagram.  The risk (in terms of a 
given end state S) for an individual safety performance indicator is defined as  




)( NSIΦ  denotes the frequency of the risk indicator NSI  observed, and )|Pr( NSIS   is the 
risk weight defined as the conditional probability of a selected end state category given 
the occurrence of the safety performance indicator--- )|Pr( NSIS . Here S denotes a 
selected end state or end states category, and NSI  is a specified indicator.  
If S has more than one end state, then risk level is calculated as the sum of the risk 









 where k indicates the number of end states. 





m SISPSIRiskTotal ∑Φ=  
In a single event sequence diagram, because the end states are exclusive, the total risk 
weight is the exact approach.  If the end states category includes multiple event sequence 
diagrams, this summation works based on the rare events assumption for each single end 
state in this category. 
6.2 Risk Weight Quantification for Different HCL Elements  
The safety performance indicator can be the basic event in the fault tree, a node in the 
Bayesian belief networks, a pivotal event in the event sequence diagram, or an 
intermediate event in the fault tree. 
Fault Tree Basic Event as Safety Performance Indicator: When the 
safety performance indicator is a basic event, the risk weight calculation is the same as 
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the conditional probability )|( eSP calculation in the importance measure.  By assuming 
1)Pr( =NSI  and traversing the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram one time, the probability 
will be the conditional probability or risk weight of )|Pr( NSIS .  (In the IRIS software 
code, this conditional probability is pre-calculated and stored for the use in importance 
measure and risk indicator quantification.) 
Bayesian Belief Networks Node as Safety Performance Indicator: 
When the safety performance indicator is a Bayesian belief network node, the risk weight 
is defined as: )1|Pr( =xstateSIS , where 1=xstateSI means SI  is instantiated to a specific 
state ( xstate ).The reason is that the nodes in Bayesian belief networks can have multiple 
states. 
The quantification procedure for this risk weight is:  
1. Instantiate the node to a specific state in the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram  
2. Run the standard Bayesian belief network and store the result for the use in Step 4 
3. Select and keep that risk indicator in the specific state 
4. Run the standard Hybrid Causal Logic diagram quantification procedure and 
using the result from Step 2  
When the basic event in the fault tree is the intersectional node between the fault tree and 
the Bayesian belief networks, the quantification of the risk weight is the same as for the 
nodes in the Bayesian belief network. 
Fault Tree Intermediate Event as Safety Performance Indicator: 
When the safety performance indicator is a fault tree intermediate event or a gate event, 
the safety performance indicator is still defined as: 
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)|Pr()( NN SISSIRisk Φ= where 
1. NSI is the intermediate event or a top event in the fault tree  
2. )( NSIΦ  is the frequency observed for that event 












In the hybrid causal diagram application, NSIS ⋅ is graphically done through the standard 
binary decision diagram AND operation.  
Note that in this kind of safety performance indicator, the quantity )Pr( NSI  calculated 
from the model, should match the frequency )( NSIΦ .  
Pivotal Event as Safety Performance Indicator: When the safety 
performance indicator is a pivotal event of an event sequence diagram, if it is linked to 
fault tree top event, the computation is the same as in the case of fault tree intermediate or 
top event.  If the pivotal event is linked to the Bayesian belief networks, the computation 
is the same as in the case of Bayesian belief networks node.  
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7. Uncertainty Propagation in Hybrid Causal Logic 
Diagram 
7.1 Introduction 
The BBN probability values conditions could be subject to uncertainty themselves. 
Uncertainty propagation for Hybrid Causal Logic diagram is discussed in this Chapter.  
An example of uncertainty propagation with sampling from distributions of fault tree 
basic event probabilities, event sequence diagram pivotal event probabilities, and BBN 
prior and conditional probabilities is presented.  The Dirichlet distribution is proposed as 
an appropriate distribution to model the prior and conditional probability distribution for 
may BBN applications.  
The uncertainty in Hybrid Causal Logic diagram can also come from structures or 
variables and the BBN model (Model Uncertainty).  However structural uncertainty 
assessment is not in the scope of this research.  
7.2 Uncertainty Distributions 
The Dirichlet distribution is the continuous multivariate probability distributions 
parameterized by the vector α of nonnegative reals. It is the multivariate generalization 












i δα α Where ),...,( 1 Kααα = is a parameter vector with 0≥iα  
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This distribution can be used for all discretized BBN nodes as the joint probability 
distribution over the domain of all variables and all conditional distributions.  
7.3 Uncertainty Sampling 
The uncertainty propagation will be the problem of how to propagate Dirichlet 
distributions in the BBN part of the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram. Uncertainty 
propagation is done using Monte Carlo sampling. It is especially useful for complex, 
nonlinear cases or cases involving many uncertain parameters, such as Bayesian belief 
networks. The procedures follow: 
1) Create a Hybrid Causal Logic diagram.  
2) Generate random values for input avriables: 
 prior probabilities of Bayesian belief network root nodes. 
 conditional probabilities of Bayesian belief networks. 
 probabilities of fault tree and event sequence diagram basic events that are not 
dependent on Bayesian belief networks nodes. 
3) Evaluate the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram (e.g., calculate the probabilities of the end 
states). 
4) Repeat step 2 and 3 enough times for desired accuracy. 
 
The methodology for generating Dirichlet random numbers is to sample a random vector 






ix  from K-dimensional Dirichlet distribution with 
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parameters ),...,( 1 Kαα . The first step of the procedure is to draw K independent random 








































α K respectively.  
The approach here is to start from the uniform distribution and generate a random gamma 
distribution number; from the gamma distribution number we get the random Dirichlet 
distribution number. Ahrens and Dieter have shown an efficient method to generate the 
Gamma random number [Ahrens and Dieter, 1974] [Ahrens and Dieter, 1982]. We use 
this (from Randlib C language library.) 
 
The following is an example of the procedure for uncertainty propagation in a Hybrid 
Causal Logic diagram.  All variables are assumed to be binary.  This will simplify the 
Dirichlet distribution to Beta distribution in the Bayesian belief networks. It includes 
distributions of prior probability of the Bayesian belief network nodes, distributions of 
the conditional probability table, and the distributions of the fault tree basic event 






Figure 40: Hybrid Causal Logic uncertainty propagation for numerical example 
 























Node C:  
A B C P(C|A,B) 
0 0 0 0.9 
0 0 1 0.1 
0 1 0 0.6 
0 1 1 0.4 
1 0 0 0.45 
1 0 1 0.55 
1 1 0 0.2 
1 1 1 0.8 
 
Table 13: The mean values of the distributions of the prior and conditional probabilities of 
the uncertainty propagation example 
 
The uncertainty distribution of the probability of the fault tree basic event 0 is a Beta 
distribution )7,1(β .  Basic event 1 is linked to node C in the Bayesian belief network.  
The uncertainty distribution of the probability of the initiator is a Beta distribution )9,1(β .  
The pivotal event PE is linked to the fault tree top event. 
Several of the input distributions and intermediate distribution resulting from uncertainty 






















































a1= 0.31542,   a2= 0.68458
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a1= 0 .68458 ,   a2= 0 .31542

























Figure 44:  Probability density function plotting for conditional probability C1|A0B0 
 
Figure 45 is a plot of the distribution of State C1 of event C. The mean values obtained 
through uncertainty propagation are compared against the point estimate results in Table 
14 and Table 15. 









a1= 0 .9047 ,   a 2= 0 .095296
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Figure 45:  Probability density function plotting for state C1 
 
 Point Estimation Mean of Distribution 
A0 0.3 0.315418 
A1 0.7 0.684582 
B0 0.2 0.218211 
B1 0.8 0.781789 
C0|A0B0 0.9 0.904704 
C1|A0B0 0.1 0.095296 
C0|A0B1 0.6 0.634658 
C1|A0B1 0.4 0.365342 
C0|A1B0 0.45 0.488883 
C1|A1B0 0.55 0.511117 








a 1 = 0 . 6 4 5 9 ,   a 2 = 0 . 3 5 4 1
P ro b a b i l i t y  D e n s i t y  F u n c t io n
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C0|A1B1 0.2 0.198867 
C1|A1B1 0.8 0.801133 
Basic Event 0 0.125 0.124236 
Initiator  0.1 0.101249 
 
Table 14: The sampling data and the point estimation data 
 
 Result from Point 
Estimation 
Mean Values from 
Uncertainty 
Propagation 
C0 0.373 0.3541 
C1 0.627 0.6459 




Table 15: Comparison of results based on point estimates and mean values based on 





8. Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian Belief Networks in 
Hybrid Causal Logic 
8.1 Introduction 
The Bayesian belief network is a powerful tool not only for graphically representing the 
relationships among a set of variables, but also for dealing with uncertainties in the 
domain.  However even with this flexibility there are many situations where it is not 
possible to get numerical values for the probabilities of basis variables and conditional 
probabilities of the BBN model.  In such cases subject matter experts may be more 
willing to express their opinions using qualitative scales. Also most survey instruments 
and assessment methods often used in social sciences and human behavior disciplines are 
based on qualitative scales. Therefore in most applications some BBN nodes and 
conditional relations can be expressed quantitatively, while others require a qualitative 
measure. The Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian belief network (QQ_BBN) provides a 
solution. A QQ-BBN is a belief network where some of the model likelihoods are 
expressed with qualitative measures (e.g, High, Medium, Low) and others are based on 
probability scales. A set of likelihood propagation rules and inference procedures enables 
the mixed likelihood types to work together in a single BBN.   
8.2 QQ-BBN Analysis Methodology 
The qualitative-quantitative Bayesian belief network approach is accomplished in two 
ways.  One way is through a “qualitative algebra” ---the prior and the conditional 
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probabilities are treated as symbols, or some specific words used to scale the subject of 
the assessment (e.g., impossible, unlikely, fair, probable, certain). The BBN inference is 
done through operations on symbols. The inference will stay in this symbolic set.  
Examples of the “qualitative algebra” needed are listed in Table 16 and Table 17.   
 
 Low Medium High 
Low Low Medium High 
Medium Medium Medium High 
High High High High 
 
Table 16: A Qualitative Addition Rule  
 
 Low Medium High 
Low Low Low Medium 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
High Medium Medium High 
 
Table 17: A Qualitative Multiplication Rule  
 
An alternative is to assign a discrete value to the qualitative scales.  For example the 
qualitative terms {impossible, little, fair, probable, certain} would be converted into 
numerical values such as {0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1}. Once this is done the usual BBN inference 
algorithm can be applied.  
Example 1: A qualitative inference example is shown using Figure 46: 
Flu Fever
 





























Example 2:  Using the second method in which the qualitative scales are converted into a 
specific finite quantitative scale (for instance: Low=0.2, Medium=0.5, High=0.8}, the 
BBN can be quantified using the typical probabilistic inference methods. This is 
illustrated using the BBN of Figure 47.  The corresponding prior and conditional 





















S R P(W) 
True True 0.8 
True False 0.8 
False True 0.8 
False False 0.2 
 
Table 18: Prior and conditional probability table for the Bayesian belief network in Figure 
47 
 
The inference process is as follows: We first perform inference by using the numerical 
values in typical Bayesian belief network inference algorithms, and then convert the 
resulting value(s) to corresponding adjective(s).  In this example, upon applying the 
junction tree algorithm, the probability for “wet grass” is 0.632. In the qualitative display, 
it will be shown as “medium”.   
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To run the inference in a purely qualitative way, the prior and conditional probability 
tables (Table 19) can be used along with the qualitative algebra of Table 17 and Table 18 
to arrive at the results.  
 
 









S R P(W) 
True True High 
True False High 
False True High 
False False Low 
 
Table 19: The qualitative prior and conditional probability tables for Figure 47 
 
We can simply apply the Pearl’s message passing algorithm [Pearl 1986-1], and each 
time look up the computational Table 16 and Table 17 to find the corresponding result. 
 
P(S)= Low * Medium + High * Medium =Low + Medium = Medium 
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P(R)= Medium * High + Medium *Low = Medium + Low = Medium 
P(W)= High *  Medium * Medium + High * Medium * Medium + High * Medium * 
Medium + Low * Medium * Medium = Medium + Medium + Medium + low = Medium 
 
This result matches the result based on numerical conversion, but there are limitations in 
this qualitative inference. This is discussed in later.  In this type of qualitative-
quantitative Bayesian belief networks, all inferences are approximate, and as such Peal’s 
message-passing algorithm is good enough [Weiss, 2000]. There is no need to apply 
more exact methods such as the junction tree algorithm or conditioning algorithm.  
8.3 The Layer between Qualitative and Quantitative Domains 
In QQ-BBNs, qualitative likelihood propagation "calculus" caries the inference from 
deeper layers of the network to the points where assessments of probabilities is possible 
based on observation or expert judgment. Such mixed BBNs require a linkage between 
the two scales at the boundary between the qualitative and quantitative parts. The 
assessment of the probabilities at the interface will almost always have to be done by 
subject matter experts, with much care to ensure the consistency with the qualitative and 








Figure 48: Boundary between qualitative and quantitative Bayesian belief networks 
 
In the Integrated Risk Information System software, this is done by setting the property 
of the nodes. If the children nodes are quantitative, the parents will check the scale table 
to covert its scale to number, then sending to the children.  If not, the qualitative scale 
symbol will be transformed to the children to continue the quantification.  The qualitative 
and quantitative inference are transferable, it can go from qualitative to quantitative as 
shown in  





9. Software Implementation of the Hybrid Causal Logic 
Methodology 
The methodology described in previous chapters has been implemented in a computer 
software called the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) [Mosleh et al 2006].  The 
development involved a team of 10 students and software programmers. IRIS features a 
conventional probabilistic risk assessment tool for event sequence diagrams and fault tree 
analyses.  Furthermore, it incorporates the power of Bayesian belief networks, and the 
combined logic in form of HCL models.  This section briefly describes the main features 
of IRIS.  
9.1 Main Features of the Integrated Risk Information System  
9.1.1 Event Sequence Diagram Analysis 
The event sequence diagram analysis as shown in Figure 49 is the top layer of Hybrid 
Causal Logic software modeling capability.  It describes the possible risk scenarios 
following potential perturbations of normal system operation.  The pivotal events in the 
event sequence diagram can be modeled by fault trees or Bayesian belief networks.  Each 
scenario leads to an end-state and consequence that designates the severity of that 
scenario.  IRIS allows the user to use “pinch points” when building the diagram. The use 
of pinch point makes the diagram more compact and more apparent to the user. The user 
can analyze the single scenario or a category of scenarios.  In each project, the user can 




Figure 49: Event sequence diagram analysis in Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
 
Some key features in the event sequence diagram module are: 
• Copy and paste function to easily copy and paste between different diagrams. 
• A “pinch point” capability so that scenarios with identical futures given a 
particular point in their evolution could be grouped at that point, leading to more 
compact ESD diagram.   
• Customizable result view (Figure 50).  The user can select the end state type to 
filter the scenario ranking view, for example, when the user only wants to see a 
specific scenario.  The user also can choose the end state type to filter the view.    
• Comprehensive scenario analysis information, including scenario probability, 





Figure 50: Event sequence diagram analysis result 
 
9.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
Hybrid Causal Logic Software (IRIS) has a state-of-art fault tree analysis capability.  The 
software has a user-friendly interface to build the fault tree (see Figure 51).  The user can 
simply drag and drop the fault tree gate and events to the diagram window.  It supports 
move, copy and paste function.  The analysis feature includes fault tree top event 
quantification, minimal cut set identification and quantification, importance measure, and 




Figure 51: Fault tree analysis in Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
 
Because the Hybrid Causal Logic algorithm has adopted the Binary Decision Diagram, 
the fault tree analysis is fast and the result is exact compared with the traditional cut set 
based fault tree analysis methods.  
The fault tree analysis result screen of IRIS is shown In Figure 52. The top event name, 
type, unavailability are presented.  The minimal cut sets of the fault tree and their ranking 




Figure 52: IRIS fault tree analysis result view 
  
9.1.3 Bayesian Belief Network Analysis 
Bayesian belief networks analysis screen (shown in Figure 53) is fully integrated into the 
IRIS software, making IRIS a different PRA software class compared with conventional 




Figure 53: Bayesian belief network analysis in Hybrid Causal Logic software (IRIS) 
 
The IRIS BBN analysis feature capability has a full inference capability. It can run 
inquiries for any node and the user can set evidence on any state of any node.  The BBN 
results screen is shown in Figure 54. The node information can be seen by clicking on the 




Figure 54: IRIS Bayesian belief network analysis result 
The Bayesian belief analysis result can also be viewed in tabulated form (see Figure 55) 





Figure 55: Tabulated Bayesian belief network analysis result 
 
9.1.4 Integrated Hybrid Causal Logic Analysis Feature 
The main feature of Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is the integration of the 
three layers of models.  The user can build and link any combination of event sequence 
diagrams, fault trees and Bayesian belief networks to create comprehensive linked 
models of the system.  The combined model is then solved by Hybrid Causal Logic 
algorithms discussed in previous chapters.   
In the event sequence diagram level analysis, the fault trees and Bayesian belief networks 
are counted in, and the dependency is eliminated by the Hybrid Causal Logic algorithm.  
In the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram analysis, the importance analysis (see Figure 56) and 




Figure 56: Importance measurement feature for linked Hybrid Causal Logic diagrams in 
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
 
A path highlighting feature provides the user with a clear view of various causal paths 
from a given cause (BBN node or fault tree basic event) to a given end state. The 
following example (see Figure 57) shows the bottom-up highlighting from a basic event 





Figure 57: Causal path highlighting feature in Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
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This highlighting feature is very helpful when the user wants to understand an accident 
path resulting from a specific event. 
9.2 Software Testing 
9.2.1 Testing Scope  
The Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) software was tested in two levels: (1) the 
computational engine level without Graphical User Interface (GUI), and  (2) GUI test 
Because (IRIS) is the first software integrating the Bayesian belief network, event 
sequence diagram and fault tree together, the expected probability values for validating 
the results of the code were obtained through converting the test HCL models to Bayesian 
belief networks and solving it with a third party BBN algorithm.  The cut set of 
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) were compared with other software, including 
Saphire [https://saphire.inl.gov/]  and QRAS [Groen et al., 2002]. The testing has covered 
the following cases: 
Event Sequence Diagram: The following test cases were included:  
1. Single path (no pinch points).  (As shown in Figure 58 when the pivotal events in 
event sequence diagram have several incoming path, the point where the path 
comes together is called pinch point. (Pinch points in event sequence diagrams 
may also be called middle state). 
2. Multiple paths (simple pinch point, merging two sequences). 
3. Multiple paths (complex pinch point, at least three sequences merged). 
4. Path includes failed branches. 
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5. Path includes success branches. 
6. Multiple event sequence diagrams, without fault trees attached to them, in one 
project file.  




multiple pinch points in
a single sequence
 
Figure 58: Pinch point configurations 
 
Fault Tree Analysis: The following cases were tested: 
1. AND Gate. 
2. OR Gate. 
3. NOT Gate. 
4. K-out-of-N Gate. 
5. Multiple instances of a basic event within a fault tree. 
6. Multiple instances of a basic event across the fault trees. 
7. Basic events linked to one Bayesian belief network.  
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8. Basic events linked to multiple Bayesian belief networks (in a single fault tree or 
separate fault trees). 
9. Multiple basic events linked to a single Bayesian belief network (in a single fault 
tree or separate fault trees). 
 
Bayesian Belief Networks: In this test category both singly connected and multiply 
connected BBNs were tested. Tests included were:   
1. Bayesian belief networks which are polytrees. 
2. Bayesian belief networks containing loops. 
Numerical Ranges: In the qualitative analysis, both very small numbers and very 
large probabilities were tested.    
1. Small basic event probabilities (< 1E-4). 
2. Large basic event probabilities (> 0.1). 
3. Small scenario probability (expected result) (<1E-4). 
4. Large scenario probability (expected result) (>0.1). 
Importance Measures: Following test coverage and criteria were met: 
1. Importance measure measuring the basic event in the fault tree (linked to, or not 
linked to, the Bayesian belief network.). 
2. Importance measure measuring the pivotal event without fault trees attached in 
the event sequence diagram. 
3. Importance measure measuring the nodes in Bayesian belief networks. 




5. Importance measure measuring the category importance across multiple event 
sequence diagram. 
Cut Set Identification: Both fault tree level and scenario level cut sets were tested. 
Large Scale Models: Test cases included large fault trees, large event sequence 
diagrams and the large Bayesian belief networks:  
1. Large fault tree (More than 200 events, 100 gates) 
2. Large event sequence diagram (More than 100 pivotal events) 
3. Large Bayesian belief networks. (More than 50 nodes, 80 arcs and 1000 
parameters) 
4. Large scale HCL with large event sequence diagram, large fault tree, and large 
Bayesian belief networks.  
Risk Indicator: In the risk indicator testing, the following types of indicators were 
used:  
1. Fault tree basic events or pivotal events (without fault tree attached)  
2. Fault tree gates or pivotal events, with fault tree attached  
3. BBN nodes 
4. Risk indicator corresponding to a single end state. 
5. Risk indicator corresponding to an end stage category within one event sequence 
diagram. 
6. Risk indicator corresponding to one or more end state categories within multiple 
event sequence diagrams. 
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9.2.2 Probability Computation Approach 
To validate the Hybrid Causal Logic diagram probability computations in all tests, the 
models were converted to equivalent Bayesian belief networks and performed analysis in 
the GeNie software [http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/].  In the test, all the top event failure 
probabilities and scenario probabilities are calculated based on the exact computation; 
there are no rare events assumptions.   
9.3 A Large Realistic Example 
The following describes a full example with event sequence diagram, fault trees (see 
Figure 59 and Figure 60), and a large BBN (see Figure 61).  The event sequence diagram 
and the fault tree were developed by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the 
Netherlands (NLR), under contract from FAA.  The Bayesian belief network was 
developed by Hi-Tech Inc, also under the FAA contract [Eghbali and Mandalapu, 2005].  
The conditional probability tables of the BBN are provided in Appendix 2. 
The event sequence diagram in Figure 59 presents the different scenarios due to a single 
engine failure.  After the initiator – single engine failure, the flight crew can take 
different actions such as restore engine power; maintain control, and so on.  Eventually, 
the actions lead to four different end states: Collision with Ground, Aircraft Lands off 
Runway, Aircraft Continues Landing, and Aircraft Continues Flight.  
The fault tree in Figure 60 models the causes of the initiator – single engine failure. It 
includes the internal engine failure, engine failure by external factor, engine management 





Single Engine Failure Dual Engine Failure
Total Power
Loss












































Figure 59: Event sequence diagram of the full example
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In Figure 59, the asymmetric thrust is due to an engine shutdown, feathered propeller or 
engine in idle thrust. The pivotal event  “flight crew fails to maintain control (2)” 
incorporates control of speed, altitude, pitch and roll.  Flight crew skills related to 
powerless flight. The pivotal event “flight crew fails to maintain control (3)” incorporates 
control of speed, altitude, pitch and roll, and power management.  Flight crew skills 
related to one engine inoperative flight. 
In the end state “aircraft lands off runway”, off runway means a forced landing in file or 
ditching.  The probabilities of pivotal events are point estimated as in Table 20.  The 





Dual Engine Failure 5.50E-4 
Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power 8.20E-1 
Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine 6.70E-5 
Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control (2) 3.00E-1 
Aircraft unable to Reach Airport 9.43E-1 
Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control (3) 1.00E-4 
 































































The fault tree in Figure 60 has 17 basic events.  In the fault tree, the basic event – Engine 
Failure Maintenance Related, is modeled by the Bayesian belief networks in Figure 61.  
Point estimates of the probabilities of other basic events are listed Table 21. 
Basic Events Probability 
 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew 8.0E-6 
Controls and Access Failure 4.1E-5 
Installation Items Failure 5.9E-5 
Bird Ingestion in Engine 8.0E-6 
Ice/Snow/Water/Slush Ingestion 3.3E-7 
Foreign Object Damage 1.4E-6 
Fuel Starvation 1.7E-8 
Fuel Exhaustion 3.4E-8 
Fan 1.5E-5 
Low Pressure Compressor 4.0E-6 
High Pressure Compressor 1.5E-5 
Combustion Chamber 5.0E-7 
High Pressure Turbine 1.5E-5 
Low Pressure Turbine 1.0E-5 
Exhaust 5.0E-7 
 





The Bayesian belief network in Figure 61 is used to model the basic event - Engine 
Failure Maintenance Related in Figure 60.  The node - In Service Aircraft Airworthiness 
will be linked to the basic event - Engine Failure Maintenance Related in the fault tree.  
The Bayesian belief network in Figure 61 has 52 nodes and 85 links between the 58 
nodes.  This Bayesian belief network incorporates the procedures, the audits, the tools, 
the technician, the calibration, the parts and material and so on factors in one network, to 









This example has all the three layers discussed previously; the event sequence diagram 
shows the scenario when a single engine failure happens, its consequence and respective 
probability.  A fault tree is used to model the details of the initiator.  Furthermore, the 
basic event – engine failure maintenance related in the fault tree can be modeled by the 
Bayesian belief network in Figure 61 by linking the basic event to the Bayesian belief 
network node – “In service Aircraft Airworthiness” in the Hybrid Causal Logic analyzer.  
The Hybrid Causal Logic algorithm is used to quantifying the whole hybrid diagram and 
gets the exact result. 
The “In service Aircraft Airworthiness” probability is 0.057.  The fault tree top event 
probability is 0.05777.    
Scenario Probability 
SingleEngineFailure:  Collision with Ground 1.52E-5 
SingleEngineFailure:  Aircraft Lands off Runway  2.31E-5 
SingleEngineFailure:  Aircraft Continues Flight 1.04E-2 
SingleEngineFailure:  Aircraft Continues Landing 4.73E-2 
 
Table 22:  Scenario probability of the full example 
 
The analysis result of Table 22, is the same as one obtained by mapping the entire hybrid 
causal logic diagram to a single BBN.  Table 23  provides the importance measures. The 
reference end state is collision with ground in the event sequence diagram. 
 




Dual Engine Failure 1.14E3 6.26E-1 
Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power 1.08 8.87E-1 
Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine 9.29E2 6.20E-2 
Aircraft unable to Reach Airport 1.00 9.43E-1 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew 6.57E4 5.25E-1 
Engine Failure Maintenance Related 6.57E4 3.78E2 
Controls and Access Failures 6.57E4 2.67 
Installation Items Failure 6.57E4 4.53 
Exhaust 6.57E4 3.29E-2 
Manual Management 1.0028 4.70E-2 
RTSI Procedures 1.040 3.60E-2 
CASS Procedures 1.007 7.30E-2 
Repair Procedures 1.007 5.00E-2 
CAMP Procedures 1.06 6.60E-2 
AD Management 1.007 3.50E-2 
MX Schedules 1.007 4.50E-2 
 
Table 23:  Importance Measurement example for the comprehensive example 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 6, performance indicators can be selected and analyzed using 
HCL models. Table 24 is an example based on the current comprehensive example. The 
scenario is from the initiator – single engine failure to the end state – collision with 
Ground.  The frequency of the event is assumed to be 3 per year.  
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Event  Performance Indicator  
Single Engine Failure 7.8E-4 
Dual Engine Failure 5.1E-2 
Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power 4.94 
Aircraft unable to Reach Airport 4.57E-5 
Engine Failure Maintenance Related 7.9E-4 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew 7.9E-4 
Controls and Access Failure 7.9E-4 
Installation Items Failures 7.9E-4 
Foreign Object Damage 7.9E-4 
Low Pressure Compressor 7.9E-4 
High Pressure Compressor 7.9E-4 
High Pressure Turbine 7.9E-4 
Low Pressure Turbine 7.9E-4 
Exhaust 7.9E-4 
CASE Audits 4.59E-5 
DAS/DOA Procedures 4.59E-5 
AD Management 4.59E-5 
Procurement 4.59E-5 
Outsourced Maintenance 6.57E-5 
In-House Maintenance 6.97E-5 
 





Table 25 lists the cut sets of the full example.  They were the same as those produced 
from the QRAS software [Groen et al., 2002]. 
 
 
Cut Sets Generated by QRAS 
 
HCL Produces 
Same Cut Set? 
Fuel Starvation*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight Crew 
Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine           Yes 
Fuel Exhaustion*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight Crew 
Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Fuel Starvation*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight 
Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Fuel Exhaustion*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight 
Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Fuel Starvation*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2) 
Yes 
IceSnowWaterSlush Integration*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Fuel Exhaustion*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2) 
Yes 
Exhaust*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to 
Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Combustion Chamber*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight Yes 
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Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong 
Engine 
Foreign Object Damage*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
IceSnowWaterSlush Integration*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Exhaust*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Fails 
to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Combustion Chamber*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
IceSnowWaterSlush Integration*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails 
to Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Low Pressure Compressor*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Exhaust*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2) Yes 
Combustion Chamber*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Foreign Object Damage*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 




Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Bird Ingestion in Engine*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Low Pressure Turbine*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight 
Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong 
Engine 
Yes 
Foreign Object Damage*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
High Pressure Turbine*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight 
Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong 
Engine 
Yes 
Fan*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to 
Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Shutdown Wrong Engine 
           Yes 
High Pressure Compress*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Low Pressure Compressor*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Bird Ingestion in Engine*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Yes 
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Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Low Pressure Compressor*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Controls and Access Failure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Low Pressure Turbine*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Installation Items Failure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Fan*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
High Pressure Turbine*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
High Pressure Compress*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Bird Ingestion in Engine*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Engine Mismanagement by Crew*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails 
to Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 





High Pressure Turbine*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
High Pressure Compress*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Fan*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(2) Yes 
Controls and Access Failure*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Installation Items Failure*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine 
Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Controls and Access Failure*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Installation Items Failure*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew Fails to 
Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
Engine Failure Maintenance Related*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain 
Control(2)*Flight Crew Fails to Restore Engine Power*Flight Crew 
Shutdown Wrong Engine 
Yes 
Engine Failure Maintenance Related*Flight Crew Fails to Restore 
Engine Power*Flight Crew Fails to Maintain Control(3) 
Yes 
Engine Failure Maintenance Related*DualEngineFailure*Flight Crew 
Fails to Maintain Control(2) 
Yes 
 




The above example shows that the Hybrid Causal Logic methodology can keep the 
conventional Probabilistic Risk Assessment infrastructure while significantly enhancing 
its causal modeling and probabilistic inference capability. It can provide exact scenario 
probability, importance measures, performance indicators, and cut sets.   
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10. Research Contributions, Limitations, and Path 
Forward  
10.1 Contributions  
The objective of this research was to build a hybrid causal modeling methodology to 
perform probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of complex technological systems. The PRA 
process for technological systems typically includes the following steps: objective and 
scope definition, system familiarization, identification of initiating events, scenario 
modeling, quantification, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, importance ranking, 
and data analysis.  Fault trees and event trees are widely used tools for risk scenario 
analysis in PRAs of technological systems. This methodology is most suitable for 
systems made of hardware components.  This research was motivated by the observation 
that a more comprehensive treatment of risks of technical systems would have to consider 
the entire environment within which such systems are designed and operated.  This 
environment includes the physical environment, the socio-economic environment, and in 
some cases the regulatory and oversight environment.  The technical system, supported 
by an organization of people in charge of its operation, is at the cross-section of these 
environments.  
In order to develop a more comprehensive risk model for these systems, an essential step 
is to extend the modeling capabilities of the conventional PRA methodology to also 
include risks associated with human activities and organizational factors in addition to 
hardware and software failures and adverse conditions of the physical environment.  The 
causal modeling should also extend to the influence of regulatory and oversight functions.  
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This research has offered such a methodology. It has proposed a multi-layered modeling 
approach so that most the appropriate techniques are applied to different individual 
domains of the system.   
The proposed approach, called here the Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) methodology, uses a 
three-layer modeling technique:  
1. A model to define safety/risk context.  This is done using a technique known as event 
sequence diagram (ESD) method that helps define the kinds of accidents and 
incidents that can occur in relation to the system being considered;  
2. A model that captures the behaviors of the physical system (hardware, software, and 
environmental factors) as possible causes or contributing factors to accidents and 
incidents delineated by the event sequence diagrams.  This is done by common 
system modeling techniques such as fault tress (FT); and  
3. A model to extend the causal chain of events to their potential human and 
organizational roots.  This is done using Bayesian belief networks (BBN).  Bayesian 
belief networks are particularly useful as they do not require complete knowledge of 
the relation between causes and effects.   
The integrated model is therefore a hybrid causal model with the corresponding sets of 
taxonomies and analytical and computational procedures. Since such hybrid models 
involve significant interdependencies, the nature of such dependencies are first 
determined to pave the way for developing proper algorithmic solutions of the logic 
model. Major achievements of this work are:  




• Development and testing of computer implementation of algorithms 
(collaborative work);  
• Development and implementation of algorithms for HCL–based importance 
measures, an uncertainty propagation method the BBN models, and algorithms for 
qualitative-quantitative Bayesian belief networks; and  
• Development and testing of the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) 
software based on HCL methodology. 
10.2 Limitations and Path Foreword  
The hybrid methodology introduced in this dissertation is a significant step towards more 
realistic modeling and quantification of risk. As the modeling and quantification is 
extended to even more uncertain domains via BBNs, as compared to classical PRA 
frameworks, the question of consistent treatment of various risk contributors and use of 
the analysis results for comparing different alternatives become more challenging. This is 
more pronounced when both qualitative and quantitative likelihood scales are used in the 
BBNs as suggested in Chapter 8. On this issue more work on likelihood propagation 
methods, assessment techniques and calibration guidelines is needed.  A related point is 
the method for uncertainty propagation, which in this work is limited to uncertainty on 
quantitative measures of likelihoods. The assessment and propagation of mixed 
likelihoods (quantitative and qualitative) need appropriate methods, perhaps by 
borrowing ideas from other non-probabilistic uncertainty theories.  Also while one of the 
HCL algorithms proposed here is extremely efficient for point estimate quantification of 
risk (even for vary large hybrid models), no effort was made to make the uncertainty 
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propagation method efficient. This is a problem that can be easily addressed by tapping 




Appendix 1: Bayesian Belief Networks Inference 
Algorithm Example 
1. Variable Elimination Example 
In this section, the variable elimination method is demonstrated step by step using the 
example in Figure 62. The prior and conditional probability are in Figure 26. The steps 
























A B P(B|A) 
0 0 0.9 
0 1 0.1 
1 0 0.4 




























B C P(C|B) 
0 0 0.7 
0 1 0.3 
1 0 0.2 
1 1 0.8 
 
)()|( APABP  
A B P(B|A)P(A) 
0 0 0.81 
0 1 0.09 
1 0 0.04 
1 1 0.06 
 
Table 26: Prior probability and conditional probability table for variable elimination 
example 
 
Step 1: Eliminating A 
 
∑A APABP )()|(  




Step 2: Eliminating B 
 
),()|( BAfBCP A  
 
),( BAf A  C ),()|( BAfBCP A  
0 0 0.595 
0 1 0.255 
1 0 0.03 
1 1 0.12 
 
Step 3: Eliminating factor (A, B) to get Pr(C) 
 
),()|( BAfBCP AB∑  
 




Table 27: Computation steps of variable elimination example 
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2. Conditioning Method Example 
The conditioning method is shown using the example in Figure 63. The prior and 






























A B P(B|A) 
0 0 0.9 
0 1 0.1 
1 0 0.4 




A C P(C|A) 
0 0 0.7 
0 1 0.3 
1 0 0.2 
1 1 0.8 
 
D 
B C D P(D|B,C) 
0 0 0 0.9 
0 0 1 0.1 
0 1 0 0.4 
0 1 1 0.6 
1 0 0 0.7 
1 0 1 0.3 
1 1 0 0.2 
1 1 1 0.8 
 
Table 28: Prior and conditional probability table for conditioning example 
 
Step 1: Conditioning on A, first considering the left A0 graph, eliminating A0 











Step 2: Eliminating factor (B,C) 
),(),|( CBPCBDP  
B C D P(D|B,C)P(B,C) 
0 0 0 0.45927 
0 0 1 0.05103 
0 1 0 0.08748 
0 1 1 0.13122 
1 0 0 0.03969 
1 0 1 0.01701 
1 1 0 0.00486 






Step 3: Conditioning on A, then considering the right A1 graph, eliminate A1 








Step 4: Eliminate factor (B,C) on the right A1 graph 
),(),|( CBPCBDP  
 
B C D P(D|B,C)P(B,C) 
0 0 0 0.00072 
0 0 1 0.00008 
0 1 0 0.00128 
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0 1 1 0.00192 
1 0 0 0.00084 
1 0 1 0.00036 
1 1 0 0.00096 







Step 5: Normalize to get Pr(D). It’s done by combining the two networks and normalized 




























3. Junction Tree Method Example 
Junction tree algorithm is shown following the flow chart in Figure 64 by using the 
example in Figure 65. The prior and conditional probabilities are in Table 30. The steps 













































Consistent Junction Tree 







































A B P(B|A) 
0 0 0.9 
0 1 0.1 
1 0 0.4 
1 1 0.6 
 
C 
A C P(C|A) 
0 0 0.7 
0 1 0.3 
1 0 0.2 












B C D P(D|B,C) 
0 0 0 0.9 
0 0 1 0.1 
0 1 0 0.4 
0 1 1 0.6 
1 0 0 0.7 
1 0 1 0.3 
1 1 0 0.2 
1 1 1 0.8 
 
Table 30: Prior and conditional probability table for junction tree example 
 
Step 1: Constructing the moral graph 































































Step 2: Triangulate the Moral Graph 
 
An undirected graph is triangulated if and only if every cycle of length four or greater 
contains an edge that connects two nonadjacent nodes in the cycle. 
1. This graph doesn’t need any more triangulation. 















Figure 68: Junction tree built 
 
 
Step 3: Initialization 
A B C ABCφ Initial 
Value 
0 0 0 0.567 
0 0 1 0.243 
0 1 0 0.063 
0 1 1 0.027 
1 0 0 0.008 
1 0 1 0.032 
1 1 0 0.012 
1 1 1 0.048 
 
B C BCφ Initial Value 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 1 
 
 
B C D BCDφ Initial 
Value 
0 0 0 0.9 
0 0 1 0.1 
0 1 0 0.4 
0 1 1 0.6 
1 0 0 0.7 
1 0 1 0.3 
1 1 0 0.2 
1 1 1 0.8 
 
Step 4: Global Initialization 
1. Select cluster BCD 
2. Collect evidence 
B C BCφ Updated Value 
(Collect Evidence) 
0 0 0.575 
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0 1 0.275 
1 0 0.075 




B C D BCDφ Updated Value 
(Collect Evidence) 
0 0 0 0.5175 
0 0 1 0.0575 
0 1 0 0.11 
0 1 1 0.165 
1 0 0 0.0525 
1 0 1 0.0225 
1 1 0 0.015 
1 1 1 0.06 
 
B C BCφ Updated Value 
(Distribute  Evidence) 
0 0 0.575 
0 1 0.275 
1 0 0.075 
1 1 0.075 
 
A B C ABCφ Updated Value after 
Distribute Evidence 
0 0 0 0.567 
0 0 1 0.243 
0 1 0 0.063 
0 1 1 0.027 
1 0 0 0.008 
1 0 1 0.032 
1 1 0 0.012 
1 1 1 0.048 
 




















































Appendix 2:  Conditional Probability Table of the 










































































Table 32: Conditional Probability Table of the Bayesian belief network in chapter 9.3  
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